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Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction

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  • Thorsten Clausing

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  • Thorsten Clausing, 2003. "Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 315-336, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:54:y:2003:i:4:p:315-336
    DOI: 10.1023/B:THEO.0000004258.22525.f4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bonanno, Giacomo, 1991. "The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 37-65, April.
    2. Stalnaker, Robert, 1996. "Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 133-163, October.
    3. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
    4. Samet, Dov, 1996. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December.
    5. Joseph Y. Halpern, 1999. "Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 315-330.
    6. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Rabinowicz, Wlodek, 1998. "Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 95-126, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Bonanno, 2012. "Epistemic foundations of game theory," Working Papers 70, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 9, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
    4. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2006. "Epistemic foundations for backward induction: an overview," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
    6. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    7. Giacomo Bonanno, 2018. "Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 1001-1032, September.
    8. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.

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