The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information
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- Bonanno, G., 1989. "The Logic Of Rational Play In Games Of Perfect Information," Papers 347, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
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- Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2012. "Epistemic foundations of game theory," Working Papers 70, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 159, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Yun Wang, 2015. "Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
- Ken Binmore, "undated". "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Ken Binmore, "undated". "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Marek Mikolaj Kaminski, 2019. "Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(3), pages 1-25, August.
- Thorsten Clausing, 2003. "Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 315-336, June.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
- Koboldt, Christian, 1995. "Rational Samaritans, Strategic Moves, and Rule-Governed Behavior: Some Remarks on James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma"," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 95-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
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