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The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information

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  • Bonanno, Giacomo

Abstract

For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution†exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium. The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1.

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  • Bonanno, Giacomo, 1991. "The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 37-65, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:7:y:1991:i:01:p:37-65_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2012. "Epistemic foundations of game theory," Working Papers 70, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
    5. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 159, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Yun Wang, 2015. "Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    7. Ken Binmore, "undated". "Rationality and Backward Induction," ELSE working papers 047, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    8. Ken Binmore, "undated". "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    9. Marek Mikolaj Kaminski, 2019. "Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(3), pages 1-25, August.
    10. Thorsten Clausing, 2003. "Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 315-336, June.
    11. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
    12. Koboldt, Christian, 1995. "Rational Samaritans, Strategic Moves, and Rule-Governed Behavior: Some Remarks on James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma"," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 95-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.

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