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Citations for "Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation"

by M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin

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  1. Wernerfelt, Birger, 2003. "Indirect Adjustment-Costs Under Alternative Coordination Regimes," Working papers 4336-01, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  2. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
  3. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  4. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
  5. Feess, Eberhard & Schumacher, Christoph, 2006. "Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 407-411, March.
  6. Andreas Asseyer, 2015. "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," Working Papers 2015002, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
  7. Birger Wernerfelt, 2008. "Bargaining Before or After Communication?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(2), pages 211-229, June.
  8. Che, Y.K. & Hausch, D.B., 1997. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," Working papers 9714, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  9. C. Manuel Willington, . "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv144, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  10. Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Chan, Chia-Chung & Lin, Bing-Huei & Chang, Yung-Ho & Liao, Wei-Chen, 2013. "Does bank relationship matter for corporate risk-taking? Evidence from listed firms in Taiwan," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 323-338.
  12. Gifford, Sharon, 1999. "Efficient moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 427-442, December.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
  14. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Rachael Goodhue & Leo Simon, 2016. "Agricultural contracts, adverse selection, and multiple inputs," Agricultural and Food Economics, Springer;Italian Society of Agricultural Economics (SIDEA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-33, December.
  16. David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010. "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 204-29, February.
  17. Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615.
  18. Kathleen Carey & Avi Dor, 2008. "Expense preference behavior and management “outsourcing”: a comparison of adopters and non-adopters of contract management in U.S. hospitals," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 61-75, February.
  19. Lin, Yu-Hsiu & Hu, Len-Kuo, 2009. "Optimal supervision with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 473-485, August.
  20. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
  21. Fares, M’hand, 2005. "Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 81(3), pages 535-555, Septembre.
  22. Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
  23. Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  24. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Pre-Contractual Information Acquisition," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv154, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  25. Vafai, Kouroche, 2002. "Preventing abuse of authority in hierarchies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1143-1166, October.
  26. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2014. "Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 485-496.
  27. Florin \c{S}abac, 2007. "Dynamic Agency with Renegotiation and Managerial Tenure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(5), pages 849-864, May.
  28. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet, 2000. "original papers : Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 1-21.
  29. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2007. "Information Gathering Externalities in Product Markets," Working Papers 07-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  30. Mohan Bijapur, 2011. "Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56619, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.