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Citations for "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions"

by Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Xianwen Shi & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-307, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Claudio Mezzetti & Ilia Tsetlin, 2006. "On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions," Discussion Papers in Economics 06/16, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  3. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2008. "An ascending double auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 281-306, November.
  4. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
  5. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
  6. Matthew Jackson, 2009. "Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 137-145, April.
  7. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
  8. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2002. "Seller Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-30, Claremont Colleges.
  10. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  11. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, 07.
  12. Curtis R. Taylor & Thomas D. Jeitschko, 2001. "Local Discouragement and Global Collapse: A Theory of Coordination Avalanches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 208-224, March.
  13. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2016. "An optimistic search equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 89-114, June.
  14. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
  15. Tunca, Tunay I., 2008. "Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(9-10), pages 964-996, September.
  16. Beaudry, Paul & Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2003. "An equilibrium analysis of information aggregation and fluctuations in markets with discrete decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 76-103, November.
  17. Andrew Healy, 2009. "How effectively do people learn from a variety of different opinions?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 386-416, December.
  18. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001309, UCLA Department of Economics.
  19. Joachim R. Groeger, 2016. "The Informational Content of the Limit Order Book: An Empirical Study of Prediction Markets," Papers 1609.03471, arXiv.org.
  20. Andreas Lange & John List & Michael Price, 2010. "Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field," Artefactual Field Experiments 00474, The Field Experiments Website.
  21. Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf & Justin Jia, 2009. "Information Variability Impacts in Auctions," Working Papers 0908, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  22. Messner, Simon & Vives, Xavier, 2001. "Allocative and Productive Efficiency in REE with Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 2678, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Compte, Olivier, 2000. "On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0829, Econometric Society.
  24. In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
  25. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Apr 2003.
  26. McAdams, David, 2002. "Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auction," Working papers 4249-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  27. Muendler, Marc-Andreas, 2007. "The possibility of informationally efficient markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 467-483, March.
  28. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English Auctions," Working Papers 1241, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  29. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1168, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. Terrence August & Tunay I. Tunca, 2011. "Who Should Be Responsible for Software Security? A Comparative Analysis of Liability Policies in Network Environments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(5), pages 934-959, May.
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