Information Variability Impacts in Auctions
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- Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2015. "Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2015-301, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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- Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2015. "Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release," Working Paper Series in Economics 67, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
- Joaquín Coleff & Daniel Garcia, 2017.
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- Szech, Nora & Schweizer, Nikolaus, 2015. "Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113041, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2015. "Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release," CESifo Working Paper Series 5501, CESifo Group Munich.
More about this item
Keywordsaffiliated-values auctions; auction revenue; number of bidders; increased competition; endegenous bidder participation;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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