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Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
  2. Montoro, Carlos, 2007. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate smoothing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19752, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Marc Hofstetter, 2008. "Why Have So Many Disinflations Succeeded?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 89-106, January.
  4. Juan Carlos Berganza, 1999. "Is it Welfare Improving to Insulate Monetary Policy from the Political Arena?," Working Papers wp1999_9902, CEMFI.
  5. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2018. "Undeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 455-470.
  6. Hahn, Volker, 2014. "An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 132-135.
  7. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
  8. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
  9. Manfred Neumann, 2002. "Transparency in monetary policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 353-365, December.
  10. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Central bankers in government appointed committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 363-379, June.
  12. Charemza, Wojciech & Ladley, Daniel, 2016. "Central banks’ forecasts and their bias: Evidence, effects and explanation," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 804-817.
  13. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
  14. Gabillon, Emmanuelle & Martimort, David, 2004. "The benefits of central bank's political independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 353-378, April.
  15. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 2006. "Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1857-1883, November.
  16. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 831-853, August.
  17. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February.
  18. Henry W. Chappell & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
  19. Bugarin, Mauricio Soares & Carvalho, Fábia Aparecida de, 2020. "Elections, Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure: The case for staggered terms for the president and the central banker," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 74(4), December.
  20. Brigitte Godbillon & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2001. "Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 163-179, April.
  21. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  22. Wojciech Charemza & Daniel Ladley, 2012. "MPC Voting, Forecasting and Inflation," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/23, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2013.
  23. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
  24. José I. García de Paso, 1993. "Central Bank Structure and monetary policy uncertainty," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 9314, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
  25. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
  26. Scheuerle, Andreas J., 1996. "Rationale Klienteltheorie und Parteienkooperation," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 61, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
  27. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2008. "The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 119-143, September.
  28. Rueda R., Miguel Ricardo, 2008. "Breaking Credibility in Monetary Policy: The Role of Politics in the Stability of the Central Banker," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1627, Inter-American Development Bank.
  29. M.A. Jenkins, 1996. "Central bank independence and inflation performance: panacea or placebo?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(197), pages 241-270.
  30. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
  31. Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004. "Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
  32. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.
  33. Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Designing monetary policy committees," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 47-67.
  34. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  35. Shun-ichiro Bessho & Kimiko Terai, 2013. "Fiscal restraints by advisors," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 205-232, August.
  36. Francisco Ruge‐Murcia, 2022. "How do central banks make decisions?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1643-1670, November.
  37. Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Why Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates? A Political Economy Explanation," Working Papers 2007-003, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
  38. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2015. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US," MPRA Paper 70359, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  39. Muriel Dal-Pont & Dominique Torre & Elise Tosi, 2004. "Short-term Deviations from Monetary Policy Commitment in a Monetary Union: The degrees of freedom of an independent Central Bank," Notas Económicas, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, issue 20, pages 22-38, December.
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