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Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hiriart, Yolande & Thomas, Lionel, 2017. "The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 111-136.
  2. Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2010. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 281-302, July.
  3. Helm, Carsten, 2008. "How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 263-271, December.
  4. Strand, Jon, 1999. "Efficient environmental taxation under moral hazard," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 73-88, March.
  5. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort, 2006. "The benefits of extended liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 562-582, September.
  6. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2015. "Contracts for afforestation and the role of monitoring for landowners’ willingness to accept," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-37.
  7. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1996. "Environmental protection, producer insolvency and lender liability," Chapters, in: Anastasios Xepapadeas (ed.), Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources, chapter 1, pages 1-29, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  8. Romain Bizet & Petyo Bonev & François Lévêque, 2017. "Are older nuclear reactors less safe? Evidence from incident data in the French fleet," Working Papers hal-01695160, HAL.
  9. Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2006. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation: A Mixed Model of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2006-06, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
  10. Jason Shogren & Gregory Parkhurst & Prasenjit Banerjee, 2010. "Two Cheers and a Qualm for Behavioral Environmental Economics," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(2), pages 235-247, June.
  11. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November.
  12. Daiki Kishishita & Susumu Sato, 2021. "Optimal risk regulation of monopolists with subjective risk assessment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 251-279, June.
  13. Simone Berardi & Alessandra Marcelletti, 2017. "Optimal Bank Capital Requirements: An Asymmetric Information Perspective," LEAP Working Papers 2017/2, Luiss Institute for European Analysis and Policy.
  14. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2004. "Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(3), pages 590-612, August.
  15. Thiago Morello, 2023. "An Agri-environmental Scheme for Reducing Inputs Subjected to Accidental Spillage: An Application to Agricultural Burnings by Smallholders," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(2), pages 383-408, February.
  16. Vislie, Jon, 2009. "Incentive Contracts for Public Health Care Provision under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," HERO Online Working Paper Series 2001:6, University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme.
  17. María del Carmen García‐Alonso & Paul Levine & Antonia Morga, 2004. "Export Credit Guarantees, Moral Hazard and Exports Quality," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 311-327, October.
  18. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
  19. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., 2010. "Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 45-47, January.
  20. Stéphane Hallegatte, 2012. "An exploration of the link between development, economic growth, and natural risk," Post-Print hal-00802047, HAL.
  21. Wang, Fang & Gao, Yue & Dong, Wenxu & Li, Zhiwei & Jia, Xiaoping & Tan, Raymond R., 2017. "Segmented pinch analysis for environmental risk management," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 353-361.
  22. Cramer, Benjamin W., 2022. "The moral hazard of Lax FCC land use oversight for advanced network infrastructure," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(1).
  23. Hussein, Mohamud & Martinez, Marian Garcia & Fearne, Andrew, 2013. "On The Efficiency of Management-Based Regulation: A Case Study of the UK Poultry Inspection Regime," 87th Annual Conference, April 8-10, 2013, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 158856, Agricultural Economics Society.
  24. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2000. "Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-57, CIRANO.
  25. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 137-149.
  26. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., "undated". "Fat-tail Climate Risks, Mechanism design, and Reputation," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124920, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  27. Huber, Michael, 2002. "Conceptualising Insurance: risk management under conditions of solvency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35991, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  28. Hallegatte,Stephane & Bangalore,Mook & Jouanjean,Marie Agnes, 2016. "Higher losses and slower development in the absence of disaster risk management investments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7632, The World Bank.
  29. Meunier Guy & Ponssard Jean-Pierre, 2017. "Financing innovative green projects with asymmetric information and costly public funds," Working Papers 2017-55, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  30. Stéphane Hallegatte & Jun Rentschler, 2015. "Risk Management for Development—Assessing Obstacles and Prioritizing Action," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(2), pages 193-210, February.
  31. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020. "Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
  32. Giuseppe Attanasi & Laura Concina & Caroline Kamaté & Valentina Rotondi, 2020. "Firm’s protection against disasters: are investment and insurance substitutes or complements?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(1), pages 121-151, February.
  33. Stephane Hallegatte, 2017. "A Normative Exploration of the Link Between Development, Economic Growth, and Natural Risk," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 5-31, June.
  34. Kishore Gawande & Timothy Wheeler, 1999. "Measures of Effectiveness for Governmental Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(1), pages 42-58, January.
  35. Qin, Botao & Shogren, Jason F., 2015. "Social norms, regulation, and environmental risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 22-24.
  36. Pascal Frantz & Norvald Instefjord, 2007. "Socially and privately optimal shareholder activism," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 23-43, March.
  37. Ollier, Sandrine & Thomas, Lionel, 2013. "Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2383-2403.
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