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Sustainable reputations with rating systems

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Francisco Silva, 2020. "An informational Ponzi-scheme," Documentos de Trabajo 539, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  2. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  3. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
  4. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
  6. Allen Vong, 2025. "Dynamic Mediation and Moral Hazard: From Private To Public Communication," Papers 2511.02436, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
  7. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
  8. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2021. "Reputation With Opportunities for Coasting," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 200-236.
  9. Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali, 2014. "Variable temptations and black mark reputations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 70-90.
  10. Benjamin Sperisen, 2018. "Bad Reputation Under Bounded And Fading Memory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 138-157, January.
  11. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
  12. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  13. Qingmin Liu, 2006. "Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics," Discussion Papers 06-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  14. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
  15. Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2024. "Memory and Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(3), pages 1775-1806.
  16. Daniel Hauser, 2016. "Promoting a Reputation for Quality," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 Sep 2016.
  17. Monte, Daniel & Pinheiro, Roberto, 2025. "Costly information intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
  18. Silva, Francisco, 2022. "The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 379-388.
  19. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2175-2202, September.
  20. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
  21. Yonghang Ji & Allen Vong, 2025. "Worker Selection and Efficiency," Papers 2511.05338, arXiv.org.
  22. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Incentives and Reputation when Names can be Replaced: Valjean Reinvented as Monsieur Madeleine," Documentos de Trabajo 447, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  23. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
  24. Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu, 2022. "Market screening with limited records," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 106-132.
  25. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  26. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
  27. Andrew Mell, 2011. "Re-Thinking Reputation," Economics Series Working Papers 565, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  28. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  29. Benjamin Sperisen, 2016. "Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience," Working Papers 1602, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
  30. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games," Papers 2007.14002, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
  31. Wang, Yan & Yang, Jian & Qi, Lian, 2017. "A game-theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer-to-peer commerce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 178-193.
  32. Margherita Bottero & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2013. "Limited credit records and market outcomes," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 903, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  33. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  34. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 436, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  35. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
  36. Zhu, Tian-Tian & Zeng, Hui, 2025. "Does reputation matter? The impact of China’s double world-class policy on the attraction of high-quality students," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  37. Lorecchio, Caio & Monte, Daniel, 2023. "Bad reputation with simple rating systems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 150-178.
  38. Daniel N Hauser, 2024. "Promoting a reputation for quality," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(1), pages 112-139, March.
  39. Harry Pei, 2022. "Reputation Effects under Short Memories," Papers 2207.02744, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  40. Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  41. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
  42. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas S Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
  43. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2024. "Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  44. Zhou, Xi & Chen, Shou, 2021. "FinTech innovation regulation based on reputation theory with the participation of new media," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
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