Sustainable reputations with rating systems

Citations

Cited by:

1. Francisco Silva, 2020. "An informational Ponzi-scheme," Documentos de Trabajo 539, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
2. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
   • Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
   • Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754608, HAL.
   • Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Post-Print halshs-00754608, HAL.
3. Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali, 2014. "Variable temptations and black mark reputations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 70-90.
   • Christina Aperjis & Yali Miao & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2010. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," NBER Working Papers 16423, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2012. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Working Paper Series rwp12-055, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
   • Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay, 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Scholarly Articles 5027138, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
   • Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay & Aperjis, Christina, 2012. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Scholarly Articles 9924086, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
   • Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Market Reputations," Working Paper Series 11-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
4. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
   • Thomas Wiseman, 2006. "Reputation and Impermanent Types," 2006 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.
5. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
6. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
7. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
8. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2021. "Reputation With Opportunities for Coasting," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 200-236.
   • Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2016. "Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2041, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Bar-Isaac, Heski & Deb, Joyee, 2016. "Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting," CEPR Discussion Papers 11513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
9. Benjamin Sperisen, 2018. "Bad Reputation Under Bounded And Fading Memory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 138-157, January.
10. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
11. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Reputations in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
12. Qingmin Liu, 2006. "Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics," Discussion Papers 06-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
13. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
14. Sergei Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2016. "Memory and Markets," EIEF Working Papers Series 1606, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Oct 2017.
    • Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Memory And Markets," Working Papers w0284, New Economic School (NES).
    • Sergei Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017. "Memory and Markets," CEIS Research Paper 415, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 07 Dec 2017.
15. Daniel Hauser, 2016. "Promoting a Reputation for Quality," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 Sep 2016.
16. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly," Working Papers (Old Series) 1721, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly," Working Papers 17-21R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
17. Silva, Francisco, 2022. "The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 379-388.
18. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2175-2202, September.
19. Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu, 2022. "Market screening with limited records," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 106-132.
    • Ayca Kaya & Santanu Roy, 2020. "Market Screening with Limited Records," Departmental Working Papers 2006, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
20. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
21. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas S Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
    • Johannes Horner & Nicolas Lambert, 2016. "Motivational Ratings," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2035, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings," Post-Print hal-03759599, HAL.
    • Hörner, Johannes & Lambert, Nicolas, 2020. "Motivational Ratings," TSE Working Papers 20-1134, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings," Working Papers hal-03187510, HAL.
22. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Incentives and Reputation when Names can be Replaced: Valjean Reinvented as Monsieur Madeleine," Documentos de Trabajo 447, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
23. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
24. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
25. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
    • Aislinn Bohren, 2018. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2018.
26. Andrew Mell, 2011. "Re-Thinking Reputation," Economics Series Working Papers 565, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
27. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
28. Benjamin Sperisen, 2016. "Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience," Working Papers 1602, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
29. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games," Papers 2007.14002, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
30. Wang, Yan & Yang, Jian & Qi, Lian, 2017. "A game-theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer-to-peer commerce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 178-193.
31. Margherita Bottero & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2013. "Limited credit records and market outcomes," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 903, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
32. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
33. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 436, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
34. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
35. Harry Pei, 2022. "Reputation Effects under Short Memories," Papers 2207.02744, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
36. Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
37. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
38. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2024. "Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
39. Zhou, Xi & Chen, Shou, 2021. "FinTech innovation regulation based on reputation theory with the participation of new media," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).