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Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dinko Dimitrov & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2025. "Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach," Papers 2512.18764, arXiv.org.
  2. Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
  3. Fabian R. Pieroth & Martin Bichler, 2022. "$\alpha$-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities," Papers 2211.10317, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  4. Debasis Mishra, 2014. "A Foundation for dominant strategy voting mechanisms," Discussion Papers 14-09, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  5. Pomatto, Luciano, 2022. "Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  6. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
  7. Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Matching with Incomplete Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  8. Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi, 2015. "Matching markets under (in)complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 295-314.
  9. Burkhard C. Schipper & Tina Danting Zhang, 2025. "Matching, Unanticipated Experiences, Divorce, Flirting, Rematching, Etc," Working Papers 371, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  10. Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
  11. Vincent Meisner, 2023. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2733-2745, May.
  12. Joana Pais, 2006. "On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/11, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
  13. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  14. Peralta, Esteban, 2025. "Lone wolves just got lonelier," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 55-61.
  15. Peralta, Esteban, 2025. "Efficiency, sorting, and selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
  16. Peralta, Esteban, 2024. "Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 51-58.
  17. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
  18. Pais, Joana & Pintér, Ágnes, 2008. "School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 303-328, September.
  19. EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi, 2018. "Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 2018-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  20. Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2011. "College Admissions And The Role Of Information: An Experimental Study," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(3), pages 713-737, August.
  21. Featherstone, Clayton R. & Niederle, Muriel, 2016. "Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 353-375.
  22. Vinay Ramani & K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, 2018. "Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1137-1150, November.
  23. Meisner, Vincent, 2021. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 289, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  24. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 237-239.
  25. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 208, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  26. James W. Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2010. "Marriage Matching and Intercorrelation of Preferences," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 587-602, June.
  27. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2023. "Unique stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 529-547.
  28. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-141, November.
  29. Halaburda, Hanna, 2010. "Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 365-393, July.
  30. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
  31. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 651-664, December.
  32. Coles, Peter & Shorrer, Ran, 2014. "Optimal truncation in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 591-615.
  33. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.
  34. Chen Shengqun & Wang Yingming & Shi Hailiu & Lin Yang & Li Meijuan, 2016. "Two-Sided Matching Decision-Making with Uncertain Information Under Multiple States," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 186-194, April.
  35. Li Chen, 2023. "Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 803-820, August.
  36. Eun Jeong Heo & Vikram Manjunath, 2017. "Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 5-30, January.
  37. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Papers 2009.13104, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  38. Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Oct 2012.
  39. Binglin Gong & Yingzhi Liang, 2025. "A Dynamic Matching Mechanism for College Admissions: Theory and Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(5), pages 4396-4412, May.
  40. Jaeok Park, 2017. "Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 487-509, May.
  41. Chen, Yi-Chun & Hu, Gaoji, 2024. "Bayesian stable states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 102-116.
  42. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.
  43. Hayri Alper Arslan & Yang Song & Tong Wang, 2024. "Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(1), pages 189-241, February.
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