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Two-Sided Matching Decision-Making with Uncertain Information Under Multiple States

Author

Listed:
  • Chen Shengqun
  • Shi Hailiu
  • Li Meijuan

    (School of Electronic Information Science, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou, 350108, China)

  • Wang Yingming
  • Lin Yang

    (Decision Sciences Institute, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, 350116, China)

Abstract

A novel decision-making method based on evidential reasoning is proposed for solving the two-sided matching problem with uncertain information under multiple states in this paper. Firstly, the discernment frame of evidence is constructed for two-sided matching. Secondly, the preference ordinal values given by two-sided decision-makers are transformed into rank belief degrees. On this basis, and with two-sided satisfaction as the goal, two-sided rank belief degrees are taken as pieces of evidence, and satisfaction degrees of two-sided matching are obtained through evidence fusion. Then, a decision-making model based on satisfaction degrees is constructed in order to obtain the matching solution. Finally, an illustrative example demonstrates the application of the proposed approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen Shengqun & Shi Hailiu & Li Meijuan & Wang Yingming & Lin Yang, 2016. "Two-Sided Matching Decision-Making with Uncertain Information Under Multiple States," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 186-194, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jossai:v:4:y:2016:i:2:p:186-194:n:7
    DOI: 10.21078/JSSI-2016-186-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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