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Citations for "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule"

by Austen-Smith David

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  1. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  2. Tilman Klumpp, 2007. "Communication in financial markets with several informed traders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(3), pages 437-456, December.
  3. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2012. "Asking One Too Many? Why Leaders Need to Be Decisive," ISER Discussion Paper 0857, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  4. Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Frisell, Lars, 2000. "Taking Advice from Imperfectly Informed Lobbyists: When to Match Hawks with Hawks," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 355, Stockholm School of Economics.
  6. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  7. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2015.
  8. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  9. Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Robert Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2005. "Producing and Manipulating Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 185-199, 01.
  11. Swank, Otto H., 2000. "Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 257-271, June.
  12. Battaglini, Marco & Bénabou, Roland, 2002. "Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 3611, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Pandering, Faith and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22A, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  14. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  15. Stephen Morris, 1998. "An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness," Discussion Papers 1209, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
  17. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "The Inferiority of Deliberation Under Unanimity," Discussion Papers 1360, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Calzolari, Giacomo & Immordino, Giovanni, 2005. "Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 145-172, January.
  19. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "Multidimensional Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 4393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information," THEMA Working Papers 2006-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  21. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Kawamura, Kohei, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-25, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  23. repec:dpr:wpaper:0746 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Junichiro Ishida, & Takashi Shimizu, 2012. "Can More Information Facilitate Communication?," ISER Discussion Paper 0839, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  25. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  26. Gilat Levy, 2000. "Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 404, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  27. A. Rubinstein & J. Glazer, "undated". "Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s7, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  28. Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016. "Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
  29. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:63:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Robert A.J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2001. "Producing and Manipulating Information: Private Information Providers versus Public Information Providers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-052/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  31. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2013. "Managerial Economics of Cheap Talk," Working Papers 24, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  32. Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David, 2012. "Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1850-1881.
  33. Marcoul, Philippe, 2003. "A Theory of Advice Based on Information Search Incentives," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10357, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  34. Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2016. "Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: A strategic communication experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 97-114.
  35. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
  36. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests," Discussion Papers 5, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Feb 2010.
  37. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2002. "Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 263-280, June.
  38. Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
  39. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
  40. Yuk-fai Fong & Peter Eso, 2008. "Wait and See," 2008 Meeting Papers 303, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  41. repec:esx:essedp:668 is not listed on IDEAS
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