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Citations for "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule"

by Austen-Smith David

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  1. Ronny Razin & Gilat Levy, 2004. "Multidimentional Cheap Talk," 2004 Meeting Papers 184, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2012. "Asking One Too Many? Why Leaders Need to Be Decisive," ISER Discussion Paper 0857, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  4. Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
  5. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
  6. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
  7. Junichiro Ishida, & Takashi Shimizu, 2012. "Can More Information Facilitate Communication?," ISER Discussion Paper 0839, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  8. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2001. "Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 158-173, August.
  9. Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
  11. Robert Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "Producing and Manipulating Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 908, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Gilat Levy, 2000. "Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 404, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  13. Battaglini, Marco & Bénabou, Roland, 2002. "Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 3611, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2014. "Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  15. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests," Discussion Papers 5, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Feb 2010.
  16. Gabriele Gratton, 2011. "Pandering, Faith and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  17. Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
  18. Tilman Klumpp, 2007. "Communication in financial markets with several informed traders," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 437-456, December.
  19. Frisell, Lars, 2000. "Taking Advice from Imperfectly Informed Lobbyists: When to Match Hawks with Hawks," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 355, Stockholm School of Economics.
  20. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "The Inferiority of Deliberation Under Unanimity," Discussion Papers 1360, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:63:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. repec:esx:essedp:668 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  24. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information," THEMA Working Papers 2006-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  25. Marcoul, Philippe, 2003. "A Theory of Advice Based on Information Search Incentives," Staff General Research Papers 10357, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  26. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2002. "Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 263-280, June.
  27. Calzolari, Giacomo & Immordino, Giovanni, 2005. "Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 145-172, January.
  28. Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David, 2012. "Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1850-1881.
  29. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  30. repec:dpr:wpaper:0746 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2013. "Managerial Economics of Cheap Talk," Working Papers 24, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  32. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  33. Stephen Morris, 1998. "An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness," Discussion Papers 1209, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  34. Robert A.J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2001. "Producing and Manipulating Information: Private Information Providers versus Public Information Providers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-052/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  35. Swank, Otto H., 2000. "Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 257-271, June.
  36. Yuk-fai Fong & Peter Eso, 2008. "Wait and See," 2008 Meeting Papers 303, Society for Economic Dynamics.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.