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Communication in financial markets with several informed traders

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  • Tilman Klumpp

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Tilman Klumpp, 2007. "Communication in financial markets with several informed traders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(3), pages 437-456, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:437-456
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0148-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
    2. Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Youssef Saida, 2021. "Combining Financial Information and Corporate Social Responsibility Related Information for Characterizing Corporate Disclosure: Some Insights From Moroccan Context," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 12(5), pages 58-70, October.
    2. Xiong Xiong & Zhang Jin & Jin Xi & Feng Xu, 2016. "Review on Financial Innovations in Big Data Era," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 4(6), pages 489-504, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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