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Citations for "Hiding information in electoral competition"

by Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan

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  1. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October.
  2. Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 19807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis," DFAEII Working Papers 8770, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  4. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2005. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 361-397, Summer.
  5. Kikuchi, Kazuya, 2011. "Privately informed parties and policy divergence," Discussion Papers 2011-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 998-1010, June.
  7. Agranov, Marina & Schotter, Andrew, 2013. "Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 26-39.
  8. Gabriele Gratton, 2011. "Pandering, Faith and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  9. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 148, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  10. Frisell, Lars, 2004. "Populism," Working Paper Series 166, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  11. Mike Felgenhauer, 2012. "Revealing information in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 55-68, October.
  12. Kazuya Kikuchi, 2011. "Privately informed parties and policy divergence," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd10-160, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  13. Kemal K?vanc Akoz & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2013. "Manipulated voters in competitive election campaigns," HSE Working papers WP BRP 31/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  14. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2013. "Yes Men in Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 621-659, December.
  15. Honryo, Takakazu, 2013. "Signaling Competence in Elections," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 442, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  16. Kittsteiner, Thomas & Eyster, Erik, 2007. "Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 41-70, March.
  17. Lydia Mechtenberg, 2007. "Ideology Without Ideologists," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2007-021, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  18. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
  19. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
  20. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  21. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  22. Thomas Jensen, 2013. "Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality," Discussion Papers 13-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  23. Kikuchi, Kazuya, 2011. "Privately informed parties and policy divergence," CCES Discussion Paper Series 40, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  24. Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.
  25. Lagerlöf, Johan N. M., 2003. "Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Tilman Klumpp, 2011. "Populism, Partisanship, and the Funding of Political Campaigns," Emory Economics 1107, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  27. Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Private polling in elections and voter welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2021-2056, September.
  28. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April.
  29. Robert C. Schmidt, 2015. "The political economy of climate policy," Working Papers 2015015, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
  30. Otto H. Swank & Phongthorn Wrasai, 2002. "Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-006/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 03 Dec 2002.
  31. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 413, Hunter College Department of Economics.
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