Revealing information in electoral competition
Electoral competition between two expert candidates may lead to inefficient platform choices. The present paper studies electoral competition between two experts and a third uninformed candidate. The latter behaves populistically. This seemingly useless candidate restores efficiency. The paper then endogenizes information acquisition. If the information acquisition costs are low, then equilibria with (i) three expert candidates or (ii) two experts and one uninformed candidate may arise. There are costs such that the latter equilibrium is the only pure strategy equilibrium in which information is transmitted. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stephen Morris, 1999.
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1242, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Frisell, Lars, 2009. "A theory of self-fulfilling political expectations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 715-720, June.
- Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008.
"Committees and Special Interests,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, 04.
- Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998.
"When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-97, March.
- Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers 30-97, Tel Aviv.
- Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Discussion Paper 1997-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Why Does it Take a Nixon to go to China?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 728, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2004. "Electoral competition under imperfect information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 419-446, August.
- Warneryd, Karl, 1994.
"Partisanship as Information,"
Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 371-80, September.
- Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2005.
"The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 361-397, Summer.
- Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 02/3, Hunter College Department of Economics, revised 2002.
- Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The dark side of competitive pressure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Baron, David P., 2006. "Persistent media bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 1-36, January.
- Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003.
"Hiding information in electoral competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006.
"Media Bias and Reputation,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April.
- Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 147-67, July.
- : Christian Schultz, .
"The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational,"
93-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Schultz, Christian, 1995. " The Politics of Persuasion When Voters Are Rational," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(3), pages 357-68, September.
- Christian Schultz, 1996. "Polarization and Inefficient Policies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 331-344.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:1:p:55-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.