Partisanship as Information
Intuitively, we associate different political parties with different types of policy. In contrast, this paper shows that, in the absence of differential costs of membership among parties (that is, if party membership is cheap talk), party labels cannot perfectly signal the ideologies of candidates. However, under certain conditions, parties can signal candidate types imperfectly. The paper, therefore, also provides an example of how costless communication can be effective in games of partial conflict. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:80:y:1994:i:3-4:p:371-80. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.