IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/gamebe/v17y1996i2p230-251.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
  2. Johan Van Benthem & Eric Pacuit & Olivier Roy, 2011. "Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, February.
  3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  4. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1997. "An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability," Working Papers 1009, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 247-273, September.
  6. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2001. "Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 425-435, November.
  7. Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, November.
  8. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  9. Giacomo Bonanno, 2022. "Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-20, October.
  10. Giacomo Bonanno, 2018. "Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 1001-1032, September.
  11. Giacomo Bonanno, 2012. "Epistemic foundations of game theory," Working Papers 70, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  12. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
  13. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  14. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
  15. Di Tillio, Alfredo & Halpern, Joseph Y. & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Conditional belief types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 253-268.
  16. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  17. Joseph Y. Halpern & Rafael Pass, 2018. "Game theory with translucent players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 949-976, September.
  18. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
  19. Ken Binmore, 1997. "Rationality and backward induction," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 23-41.
  20. Samet, Dov, 2005. "Counterfactuals in wonderland," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 537-541, May.
  21. Alfredo Di Tillio & Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "The predictive role of counterfactuals," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 167-182, February.
  22. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 159, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  23. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2014. "A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 221-241.
  24. Giacomo Bonanno, 2021. "Rational play in games: A behavioral approach," Working Papers 344, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  25. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 9, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  26. Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017. "Uncertain information structures and backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 135-151.
  27. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2006. "Epistemic foundations for backward induction: an overview," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  28. Samet, Dov, 2013. "Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 192-200.
  29. Raymond Deneckere & Meng-Yu Liang, 2001. "Bargaining with Interdependent Values," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20017, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  30. Ken Binmore, "undated". "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  31. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
  32. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
  33. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1998. "Counter-Counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 175-180, July.
  34. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  35. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2004. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Research Memorandum 032, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  36. Skyrms, Brian & Bell, Gary D. & Woodruff, Peter, 1999. "Theories of counter-factual and subjunctive conditionals in contexts of strategic interaction," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 275-291, September.
  37. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
  38. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
  39. Thorsten Clausing, 2003. "Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 315-336, June.
  40. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.
  41. Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Subjective reasoning--dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 54-93, July.
  42. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
  43. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 132, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  44. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 60, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  45. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  46. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Dov Samet, 2011. "Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games," Working Papers 375, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.