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Citations for "Incomplete information"

by Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad

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  1. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
  2. VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon, 2002. "Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 754, HEC Paris.
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 308-317, December.
  4. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
  5. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, 2003. "Bad Reputation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(3), pages 785-814.
  6. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Normative Microeconomics and the Social Contract," Working Papers 2001-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  7. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers hal-00593645, HAL.
  8. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, June.
  9. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1999. "Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 875-894, July.
  10. Moscati Ivan, 2009. "Interactive and common knowledge in the state-space model," CESMEP Working Papers 200903, University of Turin.
  11. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Shmaya, Eran & Solan, Eilon, 2004. "Zero-sum dynamic games and a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 319-329, August.
  13. Christian Lukas & Jens Robert Schöndube, 2008. "Trust and Adaptive Learning in Implicit Contracts," FEMM Working Papers 08017, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  14. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
  15. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2004. "Selling reputation when going out of business," Papers 04-52, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  16. Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Stochastic games: Recent results," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 48, pages 1833-1850 Elsevier.
  17. R.J., AUMANN & Jacques-Henri, DREZE, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ?," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  18. repec:eee:macchp:v2-1065 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Roger B. Myerson, 1980. "Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 432, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Recurring Bullies," Discussion Papers 1151, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
  22. Christina Pawlowitsch, 2006. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal proto-language.An approach based on the replicator dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 0604, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  23. Miklós Pintér, 2005. "A game theoretic application of inverse limit," Game Theory and Information 0503006, EconWPA, revised 21 Oct 2005.
  24. Eilon Solan & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games," Discussion Papers 1272, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. Shmuel Zamir, 2008. "Bayesian games: Games with incomplete information," Discussion Paper Series dp486, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  26. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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