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Citations for "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach"

by Schmitz, Patrick W

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  1. Maija Halonen, 2010. "Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 10/243, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 45243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
  5. Bragelien, Iver & Impink, Joost, 2014. "Relationship-Specificity, Bargaining Power Growth, and Firm Performance," Discussion Papers 2014/4, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," MPRA Paper 43407, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Oliver Guertler & Markus Lang & Tim Pawlowski, 2011. "On the Release of Players to National Teams," Working Papers 1124, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
  11. Oliver Gürtler, 2012. "A Strategic Rationale for the Use of Sell–On Fees in European Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, The North American Association of Sports Economists, vol. 13(1), pages 76-84, February.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 53717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
  14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Marina Halac, 2012. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 750-79, April.
  16. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June.
  18. Mathias Erlei & Wiebke Roß, 2013. "Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0009, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
  19. Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Erlei, Mathias & Roß, Wiebke, 2015. "Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) 140886, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
  21. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 58-62, April.
  22. Bernhard Ganglmair & Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, 2012. "Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, 06.
  23. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Muller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Optimal Ownership Structures in the Presence of Investment Signals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 103, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  28. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights," Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), : The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
  29. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9889, 01-2013.
  31. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
  33. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847, December.
  34. Leshui He, 2010. "The Ownership of the Firm under A Property Rights Approach," Working papers 2010-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  35. Mantecon, Tomas & Liu, Ian & Gao, Fei, 2012. "Empirical evidence of the value of monitoring in joint ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1045-1056.
  36. Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  37. Takanori Adachi, 2010. "Ownership Structure as a Continuous Variable: A Note on Joint Ownership in the Grossman-Hart-Moore Theory of the Firm," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2112-2118.
  38. Valeria Gattai & Piergiovanna Natale, 2014. "Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm: a Review of the Literature," Working Papers 287, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2014.
  39. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  40. Vijay Mohan, 2014. "A Note On The Property Rights Theory And The Ex Ante Value Of Information," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 205-215, 04.
  41. Macchiavello, Rocco, 2007. "Financial Constraints and the Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 6104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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