Ownership Structure as a Continuous Variable: A Note on Joint Ownership in the Grossman-Hart-Moore Theory of the Firm
This study considers the choice of ownership as a continuous variable, thereby adapting the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) theory of the firm. To do so, it is assumed that parties sign a contract that enables them to divide and use assets even after the negotiation over gains of trade fails. I show sufficient conditions for non-integration to dominate joint ownership, which is not taken into account in the original GHM model.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
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- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Susheng Wang & Tian Zhu, 2005. "Control Allocation, Revenue Sharing, And Joint Ownership," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 895-915, 08.
- Aghion, P. & Tirole, J., 1993.
"On the Management of Innovation,"
93-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Andreas Roider, 2002.
"Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse12_2002, University of Bonn, Germany, revised May 2003.
- Andreas Roider, 2004. "Asset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 787-802, Winter.
- Kurt Annen, 2009. "Efficiency out of disorder: Contested ownership in incomplete contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 597-610.
- Maija Halonen, 2002. "Reputation And The Allocation Of Ownership," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 539-558, July.
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