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Monitoring Corruptible Politicians

Citations

RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
  1. > Political Economy > Corruption

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
  2. Gianmarco Daniele & Tommaso Giommoni, 2019. "Corruption under Austerity," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19131, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  3. Hsien-Yi Chen & Sheng-Syan Chen, 2023. "Can credit default swaps exert an enduring monitoring influence on political integrity?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 445-469, February.
  4. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
  5. Buntaine, Mark T & Bagabo, Alex & Bangerter, Tanner & Bukuluki, Paul & Daniels, Brigham, 2022. "Recognizing Local Leaders as an Anti-Corruption Strategy: Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from Uganda," OSF Preprints x86q3, Center for Open Science.
  6. Shuhei Kitamura & Ryo Takahashi & Katsunori Yamada, 2025. "Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies," ISER Discussion Paper 1289, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
  7. León, Antonio & Santos, Kelly, 2026. "Political accountability and bureaucratic selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 255(C).
  8. Andrew Dustan & Stanislao Maldonado & Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte, 2018. "Motivating bureaucrats with non-monetary incentives when state capacity is weak: Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru," Working Papers 136, Peruvian Economic Association.
  9. David Almog & Romain Gauriot & Lionel Page & Daniel Martin, 2024. "AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre Court," Papers 2401.16754, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
  10. Muço, Arieda, 2025. "The politician, the party, and the president: How do political scandals propagate across the party network?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
  11. Giommoni, Tommaso, 2024. "A fistful of dollars: Rent seeking behaviour and local tax manipulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 453-469.
  12. Afridi, Farzana & Dhillon, Amrita & Chaudhuri, Arka Roy & Kaur, Dashleen, 2020. "Efficacy of Top down audits and Community Monitoring," OSF Preprints akpdy, Center for Open Science.
  13. Andrew Dustan & Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte & Stanislao Maldonado, 2018. "Motivating bureaucrats with non-monetary incentives when state capacity is weak: Evidence from large-scale," Natural Field Experiments 00664, The Field Experiments Website.
  14. Timmons, Jeffrey F. & Garfias, Francisco, 2015. "Revealed Corruption, Taxation, and Fiscal Accountability: Evidence from Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 13-27.
  15. Suárez Serrato, Juan Carlos & Wang, Xiao Yu & Zhang, Shuang, 2019. "The limits of meritocracy: Screening bureaucrats under imperfect verifiability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 223-241.
  16. Maxime Le Bihan & Benjamin Monnery, 2018. "Can public and private sanctions discipline politicians? Evidence from the French Parliament," Working Papers 1808, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon.
  17. Frederico Finan & Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2015. "The Personnel Economics of the State," NBER Working Papers 21825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Ricardo Dahis & Martin Mattsson & Nathalia Sales, 2025. "Reelection Incentives and Corruption: Revisiting the Evidence with LLM-Classified Audit Reports," Monash Economics Working Papers 2025-08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  19. Colonnelli, Emanuele & Lagaras, Spyridon & Ponticelli, Jacopo & Prem, Mounu & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2022. "Revealing corruption: Firm and worker level evidence from Brazil," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1097-1119.
  20. Feng, Chen & Tao, Yunqing & Zhang, Yan & Zhu, Xingshu, 2024. "Local land regulatory governance and land transaction prices: Micro evidence from land audits," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1133-1150.
  21. Tsur, Yacov, 2022. "Political tenure, term limits and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  22. Maxime Le Bihan & Benjamin Monnery, 2018. "Can Public and Private Sanctions Discipline Politicians? Evidence from the French Parliament," Working Papers hal-04141779, HAL.
  23. Soonwoo Kwon & Liyang Sun, 2025. "Estimating Treatment Effects Under Bounded Heterogeneity," Papers 2510.05454, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
  24. repec:osf:osfxxx:akpdy_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Tymon S{l}oczy'nski, 2018. "Interpreting OLS Estimands When Treatment Effects Are Heterogeneous: Smaller Groups Get Larger Weights," Papers 1810.01576, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
  26. Tymon Sloczynski, 2018. "A General Weighted Average Representation of the Ordinary and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimands," Working Papers 125, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
  27. Gáspár, Attila & Giommoni, Tommaso & Morelli, Massimo & Nicolò, Antonio, 2025. "Corruption and extremism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
  28. Cavalcanti, Francisco & Daniele, Gianmarco & Galletta, Sergio, 2018. "Popularity shocks and political selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 201-216.
  29. Dippel, Christian & Poyker, Michael, 2021. "Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 645-659.
  30. Inken von Borzyskowski & Patrick M Kuhn, 2020. "Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(1), pages 15-29, January.
  31. Carson, Lindsey D. & Prado, Mariana Mota, 2016. "Using institutional multiplicity to address corruption as a collective action problem: Lessons from the Brazilian case," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 56-65.
  32. Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Alexander Matros & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2018. "Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision," Working Papers 232397285, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  33. Livert, Felipe & Weaver, Julie Anne & Bordón, Paola, 2025. "Rewarding performance in disaster response: Evidence from local governments in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  34. Fuhai Hong & Dong Zhang, 2023. "Bureaucratic beliefs and law enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 357-379, September.
  35. Maximiliano Lauletta & Martín Rossi & Christian Ruzzier, 2021. "Playing Whac-A-Mole in the Fight against Corruption: Evidence from Random Audits in Brazil," Working Papers 157, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Sep 2021.
  36. Guglielmo Barone & Laura Conti & Gaia Narciso & Marco Tonello, 2020. "Auditors conflict of interest: does random selection work?," Trinity Economics Papers tep0820, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  37. Dustan, Andrew & Hernandez-Agramonte, Juan Manuel & Maldonado, Stanislao, 2023. "Motivating bureaucrats with behavioral insights when state capacity is weak: Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
  38. Abhijit Banerjee & Nils Enevoldsen & Rohini Pande & Michael Walton, 2024. "Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 323-353, July.
  39. Qun Bao & Rui Huang & Guoqin Pan & Laixun Zhao, 2025. "Inside Job, Chinese Style: Suspicious Use of Public Funds under Fiscal Pressure," Discussion Paper Series DP2025-23, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  40. Eric Avis & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2018. "Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1912-1964.
  41. Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Alexander Matros & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2020. "Public Good Provision," Working Papers 300159332, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  42. Carina Neisser & Nils Wehrhöfer, 2025. "Unintended Effects of Transparency: The Consequences of Income Disclosure by Politicians," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 354, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  43. De La O, Ana L. & Fernández-Vázquez, Pablo & Martel García, Fernando, 2023. "Federal and state audits do not increase compliance with a grant program to improve municipal infrastructure: A pre-registered field experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
  44. Giommoni, Tommaso, 2021. "Exposure to corruption and political participation: Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  45. Bo, Shiyu & Wu, Yiping & Zhong, Lingna, 2020. "Flattening of government hierarchies and misuse of public funds: Evidence from audit programs in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 141-151.
  46. Conover, Emily & Kraynak, Daniel & Singh, Prakarsh, 2023. "The effect of traffic cameras on police effort: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
  47. Li, Pei & Lu, Yi & Peng, Lu & Wang, Jin, 2024. "Information, incentives, and environmental governance: Evidence from China’s ambient air quality standards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
  48. Jiang, Shuguang & Wei, Qian, 2022. "Confucian culture, moral reminder, and soft corruption," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
  49. Jin, Gan, 2023. "Circle of fortune: The long-term impact of Western customs institution in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
  50. Jiang, Shuguang & Wei, Qian & Zhao, Lei, 2024. "Synergizing anti-corruption strategies: Group monitoring and endogenous crackdown – An experimental investigation," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  51. Elliott Ash & Sergio Galletta & Tommaso Giommoni, 2025. "A Machine Learning Approach to Analyze and Support Anticorruption Policy," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 162-193, May.
  52. Zamboni, Yves & Litschig, Stephan, 2018. "Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 133-149.
  53. Neisser, Carina & Wehrhöfer, Nils, 2026. "Outside Income as a Signal: Evidence from Politicians and Voters," IZA Discussion Papers 18576, IZA Network @ LISER.
  54. Chun‐Fang Chiang & Bei Qin, 2025. "How did the 2012 anti‐corruption campaign in China diminish the value of political connections for listed companies?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 92(367), pages 979-1008, July.
  55. Keefer, Philip & Roseth, Benjamin, 2024. "Transparency and grand corruption: Lessons from the Colombia school meals program," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 445-462.
  56. Lucas Argentieri Mariani & Mattia Longhi & Silvia Marchesi, 2025. "Reversing the Political Resource Curse: Accountability and Regional Favoritism under Capital Windfalls," Working Papers 552, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
  57. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2020. "Moral reputation and political selection in a decentralized democracy: Theory and evidence from India," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2020-26, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  58. Daniel M. Sabet, 2020. "Auditing as a tool of government accountability? Exploring divergent causal mechanisms through three Honduran cases," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 209-219, October.
  59. Bao, Qun & Huang, Rui & Pan, Guoqin & Zhao, Laixun, 2025. "Inside job, Chinese style: Suspicious use of public funds under fiscal pressure," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(PA).
  60. Maximiliano Lauletta & Martín A. Rossi & Christian A. Ruzzier, 2022. "Audits and Government Hiring Practices," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(353), pages 214-227, January.
  61. Asatryan, Zareh & Havlik, Annika & Heinemann, Friedrich & Nover, Justus, 2020. "Biases in fiscal multiplier estimates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  62. repec:osf:osfxxx:x86q3_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  63. Lehne, Jonathan & Shapiro, Jacob N. & Vanden Eynde, Oliver, 2018. "Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 62-78.
  64. Hao, Zhuoqun & Liu, Yu & Zhang, Jinfan & Zhao, Xiaoxue, 2020. "Political connection, corporate philanthropy and efficiency: Evidence from China’s anti-corruption campaign," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 688-708.
  65. Shen, Jianfu & Peng, Daoju & Hui, Eddie C.M. & Fan, Kwok Yuen, 2025. "Performance measurability, local government’s incentives, and regional air pollution reduction," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
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