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The politician, the party, and the president: How do political scandals propagate across the party network?

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  • Muço, Arieda

Abstract

This study documents that news about a local politician's misbehavior has strong repercussions on their party: cross-border and cross-electoral spillovers emerge. For identification, I use random audits conducted in Brazilian municipalities. I also use detailed geospatial information on radio antenna coverage to construct the relevant neighborhoods where information spreads. Furthermore, by analyzing a decade of newspaper articles, I show that local corruption is covered by the national media and that high corruption cases receive more coverage. The sentiment of news coverage during national elections is more likely to be negative for parties with national candidates, highlighting the important role national media plays in amplifying local events and shaping public sentiment. This study helps us better understand the interplay between local and national political dynamics and provides insights into how local misbehavior can have national repercussions.

Suggested Citation

  • Muço, Arieda, 2025. "The politician, the party, and the president: How do political scandals propagate across the party network?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:231:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125000174
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106897
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Candidates; Political parties; Local elections; Presidential elections; Media; Voter behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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