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Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit Banerjee
  • Nils Enevoldsen
  • Rohini Pande
  • Michael Walton

Abstract

Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit Banerjee & Nils Enevoldsen & Rohini Pande & Michael Walton, 2024. "Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 323-353, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:323-53
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20220088
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ben Lockwood & Francesco Porcelli & Michela Redoano & Antonio Schiavone & Benjamin Lockwood, 2022. "Does Data Disclosure Improve Local Government Performance? Evidence from Italian Municipalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 10155, CESifo.
    2. Hermes, Henning & Lergetporer, Philipp & Mierisch, Fabian & Schwerdt, Guido & Wiederhold, Simon, 2024. "Information about inequality in early child care reduces polarization in policy preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    3. Sebastian Blesse & Philipp Lergetporer & Justus Nover & Katharina Werner, 2023. "Transparency and Policy Competition: Experimental Evidence from German Citizens and Politicians," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 387, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Balasubramaniam, Vimal & Bhatiya, Apurav Yash & Das, Sabyasachi, 2020. "Synchronized Elections,Voter Behavior and Governance Outcomes : Evidence from India," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1276, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Lucas Argentieri Mariani & Mattia Longhi & Silvia Marchesi, 2025. "Reversing the Political Resource Curse: Accountability and Regional Favoritism under Capital Windfalls," Working Papers 552, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    6. Saani Rawat, 2025. "Does Urban Local Governance Matter? Evidence from India," Papers 2511.06562, arXiv.org.
    7. Carina Neisser & Nils Wehrhöfer, 2025. "Unintended Effects of Transparency: The Consequences of Income Disclosure by Politicians," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 354, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

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