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Synchronized elections strengthen party salience: Evidence from a decentralized democracy

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  • Balasubramaniam, Vimal
  • Bhatiya, Apurav Yash
  • Das, Sabyasachi

Abstract

Voters participate in multiple elections across governance tiers, often on the same day. We investigate how synchronizing two salient elections influences voter behavior and electoral outcomes, leveraging variation in the timing of national and state elections in India. We find that synchronized elections, compared to closely timed but asynchronous elections, increase political parties’ salience among voters, boosting straight-ticket voting with a small increase in turnout. These effects result in a 21% higher probability of the same political party winning across tiers, without altering candidate composition. While synchronization significantly influences state government formation, it does not affect development outcomes. We provide suggestive evidence that voters’ cognitive constraints and increased party campaigning are likely mechanisms. A synchronized election design in decentralized democracies like India can therefore affect the relative importance of parties vis-a-vis candidates during elections and potentially shape the nature of political decentralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Balasubramaniam, Vimal & Bhatiya, Apurav Yash & Das, Sabyasachi, 2025. "Synchronized elections strengthen party salience: Evidence from a decentralized democracy," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 916-936.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:53:y:2025:i:4:p:916-936
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2025.07.004
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