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Do Consumers Benefit from Concentration in the New Economy? A Review of Google's Mergers, Acquisitions, and Arrangements


  • Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst


Within the last three years, Google has acquired YouTube and DoubleClick and has attempted to control part of Yahoo!'s search advertising business. Two of the deals have not raised antitrust concerns by competition authorities. I review these deals with a focus on consumer welfare. Consumers are affected by being on one side of a multisided platform. Provided that better matches of search ads are beneficial, I demonstrate that the mergers may have positive effects for consumers through better matches between users and search ads. However, this does not substitute an in-depth antitrust assessment of the deals.

Suggested Citation

  • Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst, 2008. "Do Consumers Benefit from Concentration in the New Economy? A Review of Google's Mergers, Acquisitions, and Arrangements," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-121, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7511

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Newhouse, Joseph P., 1984. "Cream skimming, asymmetric information, and a competitive insurance market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 97-100, April.
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    6. Alessandro Fedele & Massimo Tognoni, 2010. "Failing Firm Defence With Entry Deterrence," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 365-386, October.
    7. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-289, March.
    8. Michael Baye & Matias Barenstein & Debra Holt & Pauline Ippolito & James Lacko & Jesse Leary & Janis Pappalardo & Paul Pautler & Michael Vita, 2008. "Economics at the FTC: The Google-DoubleClick Merger, Resale Price Maintenance, Mortgage Disclosures, and Credit Scoring in Auto Insurance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 33(3), pages 211-230, November.
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    10. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & WAUTHY, Xavier, 2004. "Two-sided markets and price competition with multi-homing," CORE Discussion Papers 2004030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    More about this item


    merger control; multisided platforms; screening mechanism;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices


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