IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/vfsc15/112895.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evaluating the Impact of Employment Protection on Firm-Provided Training in an RDD Framework

Author

Listed:
  • Bolli, Thomas
  • Kemper, Johanna

Abstract

This paper exploits exceptions in the application of employment protection legislation (EPL) to small firms beneath a particular size threshold to test the theoretical hypothesis that EPL increases the incentives of firms to train their employees in a regression discontinuity setting. Using firm-level data from Finland and Italy provides no empirical evidence for this hypothesis. In fact, the results rather suggest a potentially negative impact, which is unstable across empirical specifications though. We test whether this might be due to a negative selection of employees by comparing firms with low and high shares of old employees. The insignificantly higher effect of EPL for firms with older workers provides at best suggestive evidence that EPL affects training negatively though.

Suggested Citation

  • Bolli, Thomas & Kemper, Johanna, 2015. "Evaluating the Impact of Employment Protection on Firm-Provided Training in an RDD Framework," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112895, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112895
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/112895/1/VfS_2015_pid_128.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Job security, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 851-879, June.
    2. Haltiwanger, John C. & Scarpetta, Stefano & Schweiger, Helena, 2006. "Assessing Job Flows across Countries: The Role of Industry, Firm Size and Regulations," IZA Discussion Papers 2450, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Federico Cingano & Marco Leonardi & Julián Messina & Giovanni Pica, 2010. "The effects of employment protection legislation and financial market imperfections on investment: evidence from a firm-level panel of EU countries," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 25, pages 117-163, January.
    4. John Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2005. "What Have We Learned about the Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear Et al," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 345-368, September.
    5. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2010. "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 281-355, June.
    6. Burda, Michael C, 1992. " A Note on Firing Costs and Severance Benefits in Equilibrium Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(3), pages 479-489.
    7. Alan I. Barreca & Melanie Guldi & Jason M. Lindo & Glen R. Waddell, 2011. "Saving Babies? Revisiting the effect of very low birth weight classification," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(4), pages 2117-2123.
    8. Pierre, Gaelle & Scarpetta, Stefano, 2004. "Employment regulations through the eyes of employers - do they matter and how do firms respond to them?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3463, The World Bank.
    9. Bassanini, Andrea & Garnero, Andrea, 2013. "Dismissal protection and worker flows in OECD countries: Evidence from cross-country/cross-industry data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 25-41.
    10. Hijzen, Alexander & Mondauto, Leopoldo & Scarpetta, Stefano, 2013. "The Perverse Effects of Job-Security Provisions on Job Security in Italy: Results from a Regression Discontinuity Design," IZA Discussion Papers 7594, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    11. Garibaldi, Pietro & Violante, Giovanni L, 2002. "Firing Tax and Severance Payment in Search Economies: A Comparison," CEPR Discussion Papers 3636, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Financial Dependence and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 559-586, June.
    13. Picchio, Matteo & van Ours, Jan C., 2011. "Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 712-722, October.
    14. Edward P. Lazear, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726.
    15. Samuel Bentolila & Giuseppe Bertola, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402.
    16. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1999. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 112-142, February.
    17. Charlot, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2013. "Education and employment protection," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 3-23.
    18. Guido Imbens & Karthik Kalyanaraman, 2012. "Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression Discontinuity Estimator," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 933-959.
    19. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2010. "Why Do Firms Offer 'Employment Protection'?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(308), pages 613-636, October.
    20. Schivardi, Fabiano & Torrini, Roberto, 2008. "Identifying the effects of firing restrictions through size-contingent differences in regulation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 482-511, June.
    21. Messe, Pierre-Jean & Rouland, Bénédicte, 2014. "Stricter employment protection and firms' incentives to sponsor training: The case of French older workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 14-26.
    22. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627 Elsevier.
    23. McCrary, Justin, 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 698-714, February.
    24. Lee, David S. & Card, David, 2008. "Regression discontinuity inference with specification error," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 655-674, February.
    25. Felipe Balmaceda, 2010. "Firm-Provided Training and Labor Market Institutions," Documentos de Trabajo 266, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    26. Danielle Venn, 2009. "Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating the OECD Employment Protection Indicators," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 89, OECD Publishing.
    27. Almeida, Rita K. & Aterido, Reyes, 2011. "On-the-job training and rigidity of employment protection in the developing world: Evidence from differential enforcement," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(S1), pages 71-82.
    28. Fella, Giulio, 2005. "Termination restrictions and investment in general training," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1479-1499, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bratti, Massimiliano & Conti, Maurizio & Sulis, Giovanni, 2018. "Employment Protection, Temporary Contracts and Firm-Provided Training: Evidence from Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 11339, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. G. Sulis & M. Conti & M. Bratti, 2018. "Employment Protection, Temporary Contracts and Firm-provided Training: Evidence from Italy," Working Paper CRENoS 201802, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112895. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.