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The European Commission's Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances: The impact of preferences on an early warning system

  • Knedlik, Tobias

The European Commission s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It allows the preferences of the politicians involved to be analysed with regard to the two potential errors of an early warning system missing a crisis and issuing a false alarm. Such an analysis is done for the first time in this article for early warning systems in general by using a standard signals approach, including a preference-based optimisation approach, to set thresholds. It is shown that, in general, the thresholds of the Commission s Scoreboard are set low (resulting in more alarm signals), as compared to a neutral stand.

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Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order with number 80028.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80028
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  1. Bussiere, Matthieu & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2006. "Towards a new early warning system of financial crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 953-973, October.
  2. Hali J. Edison, 2003. "Do indicators of financial crises work? An evaluation of an early warning system," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(1), pages 11-53.
  3. Bussiere, Matthieu & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2008. "Low probability, high impact: Policy making and extreme events," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 111-121.
  4. Tobias Knedlik & Gregor Von Schweinitz, 2012. "Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators for Debt Crises in Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(5), pages 726-745, 09.
  5. Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
  6. Alessi, Lucia & Detken, Carsten, 2011. "Quasi real time early warning indicators for costly asset price boom/bust cycles: A role for global liquidity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 520-533, September.
  7. Makram El-Shagi & Tobias Knedlik & Gregor von Schweinitz, 2012. "Predicting Financial Crises: The (Statistical) Significance of the Signals Approach," IWH Discussion Papers 3, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
  8. Enrica Detragiache & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 1999. "Monitoring Banking Sector Fragility: A Multivariate Logit Approach," IMF Working Papers 99/147, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2000. "Incentives and Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198294245, July.
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