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Individuelle Entscheidungen zur Steuerverwendung

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  • Dilger, Alexander

Abstract

Es wird vorgeschlagen, die individuellen Steuerzahler jeweils entscheiden zu lassen, wofür die von ihnen gezahlten Steuern verwendet werden sollen, z. B. durch Zuweisung an einzelne Haushaltstitel oder größere Positionen im Staatshaushalt. Außerdem sollen die Steuerzahler wählen dürfen, diese Haushaltsentscheidungen weiterhin den gewählten Politikern zu überlassen oder Steuergelder zurückzuerstatten, jedoch nicht in Form eines individuellen Steuerrabatts, der quasi die zur Finanzierung von Kollektivgütern sinnvolle Steuerpflicht aufheben würde, sondern anteilig über einen Sondertopf, der individuell befüllt und proportional an alle Steuerzahler ausgeschüttet wird.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilger, Alexander, 2025. "Individuelle Entscheidungen zur Steuerverwendung," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 3/2025, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:315195
    DOI: 10.17879/14918765188
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Demokratie; Freiheit; Fiskalpolitik; Liberalismus; Steuern;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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