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A simple model of health insurance competition

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  • Kemnitz, Alexander

Abstract

This paper investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German health care reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that contribution rate competition yields lower company profits and higher consumer welfare than premia competition when switching between insurance companies is costly.

Suggested Citation

  • Kemnitz, Alexander, 2010. "A simple model of health insurance competition," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 09/10, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0910
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Friedrich Breyer & Andreas Haufler, 2000. "Health Care Reform: Separating Insurance from Income Redistribution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(4), pages 445-461, August.
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    5. Frank, Richard G. & Lamiraud, Karine, 2009. "Choice, price competition and complexity in markets for health insurance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 550-562, August.
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    8. Mathias Kifmann, 2005. "Health insurance in a democracy: Why is it public and why are premiums income related?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 283-308, September.
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    13. Wolfgang Buchholz, 2005. "A Note on Financing Health-Care Reform: Some Simple Arguments Concerning Marginal Tax Burden," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 61(3), pages 438-438, November.
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    18. Wolfram F. Richter, 2009. "Germany goes ahead with Health Vouchers," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(3), pages 53-60, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health Care Reform; Competition; Consumer Choice;

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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