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Intégration du marché européen de la Défense et politiques d’offsets : une analyse en termes de coûts de changement et d’externalités technologiques

Author

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  • Adel Ben Youssef

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Gueorgui Ianakiev

    (ADIS - Analyse des Dynamiques Industrielles et Sociales - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 - Département d'Economie)

Abstract

L'importance des politiques d'offsets dans le commerce international de produits de Défense n'a cessé de croître depuis les premières grandes transactions compensées des années 1970. Aujourd'hui les taux d'offset dépassent fréquemment les 100%, avec de rares transactions pouvant atteindre les 300%. A titre d'exemple, d'après le treizième rapport du Département du Commerce des Etats-Unis sur les Offsets dans le commerce de Défense, le taux moyen associé aux exportations américaines était de 72%, ce qui constitue le double de la valeur constatée en1993. En 2003 il avait atteint 125%, et pour certains pays européens tels que l'Autriche et la Pologne il était d'environ 170%. Loin d'être exceptionnels, ces taux constituent aujourd'hui la règle pour de nombreux pays. L'analyse de ce phénomène est d'une importance cruciale dans la perspective de la création d'un marché européen des produits de Défense. Le recours aux offsets peut être expliqué par l'existence simultanée de mesures nationales protectionnistes et de barrières naturelles, telles que des imperfections informationnelles et des coûts de changement de fournisseur, limitant l'établissement spontané de partenariats industriels transfrontaliers. En mobilisant les outils de l'économie industrielle et de l'analyse néo-institutionnelle, l'article a un double objectif : il s'agira d'une part, de décrire les politiques de compensation internationale selon l'approche néo-institutionnaliste et de comprendre leurs logiques contractuelles, d'autre part, de comprendre les conséquences relatives de la prise en compte de ce phénomène sur la dynamique d'intégration du marché européen des produits de Défense. En d'autres termes, en quoi les effets des barrières mentionnées peuvent se renforcer mutuellement et comment la simple suppression des barrières réglementaires pourrait s'avérer insuffisante.

Suggested Citation

  • Adel Ben Youssef & Gueorgui Ianakiev, 2009. "Intégration du marché européen de la Défense et politiques d’offsets : une analyse en termes de coûts de changement et d’externalités technologiques," Post-Print hal-01082243, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01082243
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01082243
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    References listed on IDEAS

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