Health insurance and imperfect competition in the health care market
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- Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire, 1995.
"Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment,"
0059, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 2000.
"Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 992-1005, October.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 1998. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second Best in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 6865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Feldstein, Martin S, 1970. "The Rising Price of Physicians' Services," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 52(2), pages 121-33, May.
- Chiu, W. Henry, 1997. "Health insurance and the welfare of health care consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 125-133, April.
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