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Empty creditors and strong shareholders: The real effects of credit risk trading

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  • Colonnello, Stefano
  • Efing, Matthias
  • Zucchi, Francesca

Abstract

Credit derivatives give creditors the possibility to transfer debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that the real effects of such debt unbundling crucially hinge on shareholder bargaining power. We find that creditors buy more CDS protection when facing strong shareholders to secure themselves a valuable outside option in distressed renegotiations. After the start of CDS trading, the distance-to-default, investment, and market value of firms with powerful shareholders drop by 7.9%, 7%, and 8.8% compared to other firms.
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  • Colonnello, Stefano & Efing, Matthias & Zucchi, Francesca, 2016. "Empty creditors and strong shareholders: The real effects of credit risk trading," IWH Discussion Papers 10/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-10-16
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    Cited by:

    1. Colonnello, Stefano, 2017. "Internal governance and creditor governance: Evidence from credit default swaps," IWH Discussion Papers 6/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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