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Shareholder bargaining power and the emergence of empty creditors

Author

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  • Colonnello, Stefano
  • Efing, Matthias
  • Zucchi, Francesca

Abstract

Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. If creditors would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation, firms are more likely to face the empty creditor problem. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.

Suggested Citation

  • Colonnello, Stefano & Efing, Matthias & Zucchi, Francesca, 2019. "Shareholder bargaining power and the emergence of empty creditors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(2), pages 297-317.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:134:y:2019:i:2:p:297-317
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.04.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Banerjee, Suman & Kong, Mingyuan, 2025. "Modeling optimal strategies in CDS markets: The role of creditor-issuer dynamics," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    2. Dunbar, Craig G. & King, Michael R., 2023. "Syndicate structure and IPO outcomes: The impact of underwriter roles and syndicate concentration," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Gündüz, Yalin & Ongena, Steven & Tümer-Alkan, Günseli & Yu, Yuejuan, 2025. "CDS and credit: The effect of the bangs on credit insurance, lending and hedging," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    4. Yolanda Yulong Wang & Long Yi, 2025. "Takeover threats, institutional ownership, and investment efficiency," Post-Print hal-05143757, HAL.
    5. Gan, Liu & Yang, Zhaojun, 2024. "Financial decisions involving credit default swaps over the business cycle," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    6. Chu, Yongqiang & Lin, Luca X. & Xiao, Zhanbing, 2024. "Agree to disagree: Lender equity holdings, within-syndicate conflicts, and covenant design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    7. Caglio, Cecilia & Darst, R. Matthew & Parolin, Eric, 2019. "Half-full or half-empty? Financial institutions, CDS use, and corporate credit risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    8. Tak-Yuen Wong & Jin Yu, 2022. "Credit Default Swaps and Debt Overhang," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2069-2097, March.
    9. Söhnke M Bartram & Jennifer Conrad & Jongsub Lee & Marti G Subrahmanyam, 2022. "Credit Default Swaps around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(5), pages 2464-2524.
    10. Wang, Yolanda Yulong & Yi, Long, 2025. "Takeover threats, institutional ownership, and investment efficiency," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    11. Cumming, Douglas & Lu, Fanyu & Xu, Limin & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey), 2025. "Does stakeholder orientation mitigate shareholder-employee conflicts? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    12. Colonnello, Stefano, 2017. "Internal governance and creditor governance: Evidence from credit default swaps," IWH Discussion Papers 6/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    13. Hans Degryse & Yalin Gündüz & Kuchulain O'Flynn & Steven Ongena, 2020. "Identifying Empty Creditors with a Shock and Micro-Data," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 20-15, Swiss Finance Institute.
    14. Bai-Sian Chen & Hong-Yi Chen & Hsiao-Yin Chen & Fang-Chi Lin, 2022. "Corporate growth and strategic payout policy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 641-669, August.
    15. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Shen, Yinjie (Victor) & Ye, Pengfei, 2021. "Stock price fragility and the cost of bank loans," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 118-135.
    16. Hai Lin & Binh Hoang Nguyen & Junbo Wang & Cheng Zhang, 2023. "Credit default swaps and firm risk," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(11), pages 1668-1692, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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