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Half-full or half-empty? Financial institutions, CDS use, and corporate credit risk

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  • Caglio, Cecilia
  • Darst, R. Matthew
  • Parolin, Eric

Abstract

We construct a novel dataset that matches bank holding company credit default swap (CDS) positions to detailed U.S. credit registry data containing both loan and corporate bond holdings by large U.S. banks. The dataset sheds new light on how banks use CDS, and what effects, if any, CDS use has on corporate credit risk. We show that few banks insure loans, even loans of distressed borrowers, suggesting that empty creditor problems among banks are not widespread. We find that banks are more likely to sell than buy CDS when they have a lending relationship with CDS firms. We then create new aggregate measures of hedging activity based on position-level data to test the empty creditor hypothesis. Contrary to existing studies, aggregate measures of credit risk hedging that do not condition on lending relationships overstate bank hedging activity. Furthermore, our regression results do not find any evidence that firm credit risk is adversely impacted when banks in particular purchase CDS.

Suggested Citation

  • Caglio, Cecilia & Darst, R. Matthew & Parolin, Eric, 2019. "Half-full or half-empty? Financial institutions, CDS use, and corporate credit risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:40:y:2019:i:c:s1042957319300142
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2019.03.001
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    1. R. Matthew Darst & Ehraz Refayet, 2018. "Credit Default Swaps in General Equilibrium: Endogenous Default and Credit‐Spread Spillovers," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(8), pages 1901-1933, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk management; Bank lending; Credit risk; Credit default swaps;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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