IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v94y2018icp251-266.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How do firms respond to empty creditor holdout in distressed exchanges?

Author

Listed:
  • Narayanan, Rajesh
  • Uzmanoglu, Cihan

Abstract

Empty creditors—bondholders hedged with Credit Default Swaps (CDSs)—face incentives to holdout from “Distressed Exchanges” (DEs) of debt because the CDS hedge alters their payoffs to favor bankruptcy. We show using detailed data on DEs that firms respond to this holdout problem by targeting junior bondholders who are more likely to tender than senior bondholders. Furthermore, we show that doing so allows them to successfully reduce debt through the DE and avoid bankruptcy. Our evidence underscores the importance of the firm's response to the holdout problem in understanding the role of empty creditors in distress resolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Narayanan, Rajesh & Uzmanoglu, Cihan, 2018. "How do firms respond to empty creditor holdout in distressed exchanges?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 251-266.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:94:y:2018:i:c:p:251-266
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.08.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426618301717
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.08.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello, 2007. "Financial Constraints, Asset Tangibility, and Corporate Investment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(5), pages 1429-1460, 2007 12.
    2. Sris Chatterjee & Upinder S. Dhillon & Gabriel G. Ramirez, 1996. "Resolution of Financial Distress : Debt Restructurings via Chapter 11, Prepackaged Bankruptcies, and Workouts," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 25(1), Spring.
    3. Paul Asquith & Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, 1994. "Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(3), pages 625-658.
    4. Acharya, Viral V. & Bharath, Sreedhar T. & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 787-821, September.
    5. Amiram, Dan & Beaver, William H. & Landsman, Wayne R. & Zhao, Jianxin, 2017. "The effects of credit default swap trading on information asymmetry in syndicated loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 364-382.
    6. Mascia Bedendo & Lara Cathcart & Lina El‐Jahel, 2016. "Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence of Credit Default Swaps," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 165-201, February.
    7. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    8. John C. Williams & John B. Taylor, 2009. "A Black Swan in the Money Market," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 58-83, January.
    9. Gertner, Robert & Scharfstein, David, 1991. "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1189-1222, September.
    10. Franks, Julian R. & Torous, Walter N., 1994. "A comparison of financial recontracting in distressed exchanges and chapter 11 reorganizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 349-370, June.
    11. Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2011. "Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(8), pages 2617-2655.
    12. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, December.
    13. Oehmke, Martin & Zawadowski, Adam, 2016. "The anatomy of the CDS market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118964, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Schneider, Paul & Sögner, Leopold & Veža, Tanja, 2010. "The Economic Role of Jumps and Recovery Rates in the Market for Corporate Default Risk," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(6), pages 1517-1547, December.
    15. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, 2008. "Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(4), pages 663-709, September.
    16. Chatterjee, Sris & Dhillon, Upinder S. & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 1995. "Coercive tender and exchange offers in distressed high-yield debt restructurings An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 333-360, July.
    17. Martin Oehmke & Adam Zawadowski, 2017. "The Anatomy of the CDS Market," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(1), pages 80-119.
    18. Marti G. Subrahmanyam & Dragon Yongjun Tang & Sarah Qian Wang, 2014. "Does the Tail Wag the Dog?: The Effect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(10), pages 2927-2960.
    19. James, Christopher, 1996. "Bank Debt Restructurings and the Composition of Exchange Offers in Financial Distress," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 711-727, June.
    20. Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
    21. Alessio Saretto & Heather E. Tookes, 2013. "Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Credit Supply: The Role of Credit Default Swaps," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(5), pages 1190-1247.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Clark, Brian & Donato, James & Francis, Bill B., 2023. "Credit default swaps and debt specialization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    2. Hai Lin & Binh Hoang Nguyen & Junbo Wang & Cheng Zhang, 2023. "Credit default swaps and firm risk," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(11), pages 1668-1692, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. András Danis, 2017. "Do Empty Creditors Matter? Evidence from Distressed Exchange Offers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1285-1301, May.
    2. Mascia Bedendo & Lara Cathcart & Lina El‐Jahel, 2016. "Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence of Credit Default Swaps," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 165-201, February.
    3. Caglio, Cecilia & Darst, R. Matthew & Parolin, Eric, 2019. "Half-full or half-empty? Financial institutions, CDS use, and corporate credit risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    4. Kim, Gi H., 2016. "Credit derivatives as a commitment device: Evidence from the cost of corporate debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 67-83.
    5. Hwang Hee Lee & Frederick Dongchuhl Oh, 2022. "The role of credit default swaps in determining corporate payout policy," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 635-661, June.
    6. Colonnello, Stefano & Efing, Matthias & Zucchi, Francesca, 2019. "Shareholder bargaining power and the emergence of empty creditors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(2), pages 297-317.
    7. Rajesh Narayanan & Cihan Uzmanoglu, 2018. "Credit Insurance, Distress Resolution Costs, and Bond Spreads," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(4), pages 931-951, December.
    8. Shan, Chenyu & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Winton, Andrew, 2019. "Do banks still monitor when there is a market for credit protection?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2).
    9. A. Hong, Hyun & Lobo, Gerald J. & Ryou, Ji Woo, 2019. "Financial market development and firm investment in tax avoidance: Evidence from credit default swap market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-1.
    10. Hege, U. & Mella-Barral, P., 1999. "Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt," Other publications TiSEM d1806bd7-b34c-4249-b6fd-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Sarkar, Sudipto, 2013. "Distressed exchange, bargaining power, and prior capital structure," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2695-2709.
    12. Ulrich Hege & Pierre Mella-Barral, 2005. "Repeated Dilution of Diffusely Held Debt," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 737-786, May.
    13. Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2017. "Credit default swaps, exacting creditors and corporate liquidity management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 395-414.
    14. Demiroglu, Cem & James, Christopher, 2015. "Bank loans and troubled debt restructurings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 192-210.
    15. Colonnello, Stefano, 2017. "Internal governance and creditor governance: Evidence from credit default swaps," IWH Discussion Papers 6/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    16. Clark, Brian & Donato, James & Francis, Bill B & Shohfi, Thomas D, 2023. "Bank loan renegotiation and credit default swaps," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    17. Augustin, Patrick & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2014. "Credit Default Swaps: A Survey," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-196, December.
    18. Jung Koo Kang & Christopher D. Williams & Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, 2021. "CDS trading and nonrelationship lending dynamics," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 258-292, March.
    19. Söhnke M Bartram & Jennifer Conrad & Jongsub Lee & Marti G Subrahmanyam, 2022. "Credit Default Swaps around the World," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(5), pages 2464-2524.
    20. Kahl, Matthias, 2001. "Financial Distress as a Selection Mechanism: Evidence from the United States," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt0dg192r9, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit default swaps (CDSs); Empty creditors; Debt restructuring; Distressed exchange; Bankruptcy; Holdout problem; Financial distress;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:94:y:2018:i:c:p:251-266. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.