Credit default swaps and risk-shifting
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References listed on IDEAS
- Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, 2008. "Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(4), pages 663-709.
- Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2011.
"Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(8), pages 2617-2655.
- Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2010. "Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem," NBER Working Papers 15999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Arping, Stefan, 2014. "Credit protection and lending relationships," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 7-19.
- Stefano Colonnello & Matthias Efing & Francesca Zucchi, 2016.
"Empty Creditors and Strong Shareholders: The Real Effects of Credit Risk Trading,"
Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series
16-17, Swiss Finance Institute, revised Jun 2016.
- Colonnello, Stefano & Efing, Matthias & Zucchi, Francesca, 2017. "Empty creditors and strong shareholders: The real effects of credit risk trading," IWH Discussion Papers 10/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
- Colonnello, Stefano & Efing, Matthias & Zucchi, Francesca, 2016. "Empty creditors and strong shareholders: The real effects of credit risk trading," IWH Discussion Papers 10/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
- Augustin, Patrick & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2014. "Credit Default Swaps: A Survey," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-196, December.
- repec:eee:moneco:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:50-63 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsCDS; Risk-shifting; Financing efficiency; Regulation;
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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