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Shareholder Bargaining Power, Debt Overhang, and Investment

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  • Emmanuel Alanis
  • Sudheer Chava
  • Praveen Kumar

Abstract

Using a dynamic model of strategic bargaining between equity and debt holders following default, we analyze the impact of shareholder bargaining power and debt overhang on optimal investment and strategic default. Our empirical tests utilize a new measure of the debt overhang wedge based on default probabilities generated from a hazard model for bankruptcy. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, bondholder (shareholder) ownership concentration ceteris paribus enhances (weakens) the overhang wedge and dampens (increases) capital investment. We identify novel ownership-structure-related factors in firm-level capital investment and document how post-default shareholder bargaining power alleviates the underinvestment problem caused by debt overhang.Received March 26, 2018; editorial decision June 20, 2018 by Editor: Paolo Fulghieri. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuel Alanis & Sudheer Chava & Praveen Kumar, 2018. "Shareholder Bargaining Power, Debt Overhang, and Investment," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 276-318.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:7:y:2018:i:2:p:276-318.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rcfs/cfy005
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chu, Yongqiang, 2021. "Debt Renegotiation and Debt Overhang: Evidence from Lender Mergers," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 995-1021, May.
    2. Colonnello, Stefano & Efing, Matthias & Zucchi, Francesca, 2016. "Empty creditors and strong shareholders: The real effects of credit risk trading," IWH Discussion Papers 10/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    3. Sirio Aramonte & Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar & Samuel Rosen & John W. Schindler, 2022. "Firm-Specific Risk-Neutral Distributions with Options and CDS," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 7018-7033, September.
    4. Gan, Liu & Xia, Xin & Zhang, Hai, 2022. "Debt structure and debt overhang," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    5. Khawaja, Mohsin & Bhatti, M. Ishaq & Ashraf, Dawood, 2019. "Ownership and control in a double decision framework for raising capital," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    6. Flor, Christian Riis & Petersen, Kirstine Boye & Schandlbauer, Alexander, 2023. "Callable or convertible debt? The role of debt overhang and covenants," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    7. Jiang, Jinglu & Liu, Bo & Yang, Jinqiang, 2019. "The impact of debt restructuring on firm investment: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 325-337.
    8. Colonnello, Stefano & Efing, Matthias & Zucchi, Francesca, 2019. "Shareholder bargaining power and the emergence of empty creditors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(2), pages 297-317.
    9. Christine L. Dobridge, 2016. "Fiscal Stimulus and Firms: A Tale of Two Recessions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-13, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Renjie, Rex Wang & Verwijmeren, Patrick & Xia, Shuo, 2022. "Corporate governance benefits of mutual fund cooperation," IWH Discussion Papers 21/2022, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).

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