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Öffentliche Beteiligungsgesellschaften zur effizienten Finanzierung der Infrastruktur und Daseinsvorsorge

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  • Kaczmarczyk, Patrick
  • Krebs, Tom

Abstract

Wie lassen sich Infrastrukturprojekte finanzieren, ohne Haushalte und Unternehmen zu überlasten? Während viele Ökonomen und Berater für die Mobilisierung von privatem Kapital plädieren, schlagen Patrick Kaczmarczyk und Tom Krebs ein Modell öffentlicher Beteiligungsgesellschaften vor, das Eigenkapital für zentrale Bereiche der Infrastruktur und Daseinsvorsorge bereitstellt - im Rahmen der Schuldenbremse und ohne Mehrkosten durch hohe Renditen privater Investoren. Am Beispiel des Stromnetzausbaus zeigen sie, dass privates Kapital bis 2045 Zusatzkosten von rund 200 Milliarden Euro verursachen würde. Öffentliche Beteiligungen könnten dagegen die Energiewende fördern und zugleich die Realwirtschaft entlasten. Das Modell der öffentlichen Beteiligungsgesellschaft ist auf viele weitere Bereiche übertragbar, etwa auf den Nahverkehr, den Gebäudesektor oder die soziale Infrastruktur.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaczmarczyk, Patrick & Krebs, Tom, 2025. "Öffentliche Beteiligungsgesellschaften zur effizienten Finanzierung der Infrastruktur und Daseinsvorsorge," Working Paper Forschungsförderung 373, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hbsfof:323583
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Patrick Kaczmarczyk & Tom Krebs, 2025. "Finanzierungsoptionen für den Stromnetzausbau und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Netzentgelte," IMK Studies 98-2025, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    3. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    4. Tom Bauermann & Patrick Kaczmarczyk & Tom Krebs, 2024. "Ausbau der Stromnetze: Investitionsbedarfe," IMK Studies 97-2024, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    5. Krebs Tom & Scheffel Martin, 2017. "Lohnende Investitionen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 245-262, October.
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