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Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime

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  • Hefeker, Carsten

Abstract

The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Hefeker, Carsten, 2007. "Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 13, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gdec07:6536
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    debt crisis; currency crisis; exchange rate regime;

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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