IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Der lender of last resort vor Gericht

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Winkler, Adalbert

Abstract

Ist das OMT-Programm der EZB mandatswidrig? Dieser Beitrag wendet die ökonomische Argumentation der OMT-Kritiker vor dem deutschen Bundesverfassungsgericht auf die seit Oktober 2008 praktizierte Vollzuteilungspolitik an. Der Vergleich zeigt, dass danach auch die Vollzuteilungspolitik mandatswidrig ist. Die EZB steht daher nicht als Staatsfinanzierer, sondern als lender of last resort vor Gericht. Ein Richterspruch gegen das OMT würde folglich eine ökonomische Argumentation bestätigen, die 150 Jahren moderner Zentralbankgeschichte widerspricht und den Euroraum den Instabilitäten von Finanzmärkten ausliefert. Ein solcher Währungsraum ist weder funktionsfähig noch wünschenswert.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/85380/1/76953077X.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Frankfurt School of Finance and Management in its series Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series with number 206.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Handle: RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:206
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Sonnemannstraße 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt am Main

Phone: 069 154008-0
Web page: http://www.frankfurt-school.de/

More information through EDIRC

Keywords: lender of last resort; OMT-Programm; Vollzuteilungspolitik;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
  • E53 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Deposit Insurance
  • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
  2. Wolfgang Franz & Clemens Fuest & Martin Hellwig & Hans-Werner Sinn, 2010. "A Euro Rescue Plan," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(2), pages 101-104, 07.
  3. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2013. "Verantwortung der Staaten und Notenbanken in der Eurokrise," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66, pages 03-33, 06.
  4. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 468-508, August.
  5. John Joseph Wallis & Richard E. Sylla & Arthur Grinath III, 2004. "Sovereign Debt and Repudiation: The Emerging-Market Debt Crisis in the U.S. States, 1839-1843," NBER Working Papers 10753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. David Folkerts-Landau & Peter M. Garber, 1992. "The European Central Bank: A Bank or a Monetary Policy Rule," NBER Working Papers 4016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Michael D. Bordo & Harold James, 2013. "The European Crisis in the Context of the History of Previous Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 19112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung & Agnieszka Markiewicz, 2013. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 59(3), pages 449-488, September.
  9. Bindseil, Ulrich & Winkler, Adalbert, 2012. "Dual liquidity crises under alternative monetary frameworks: a financial accounts perspective," Working Paper Series 1478, European Central Bank.
  10. C. Randall Henning & Martin Kessler, 2012. "Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union," Working Paper Series WP12-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  11. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
  12. Willem Buiter & Ebrahim Rahbari, 2012. "The European Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort for Sovereigns in the Eurozone," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50, pages 6-35, 09.
  13. Philippine Cour-Thimann & Bernhard Winkler, 2012. "The ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures: the role of institutional factors and financial structure," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 765-803, WINTER.
  14. Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It work? And Are There Really 'No Alternatives'?," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(1), pages 03-09, 04.
  15. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  16. Lawrence H. White, 2008. "Did Hayek and Robbins Deepen the Great Depression?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 751-768, 06.
  17. Adalbert Winkler, 2010. "Debatte über Griechenland verfehlt Kern von Finanzkrisen," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;German National Library of Economics, vol. 90(5), pages 278-279, May.
  18. Charles Goodhart, 1988. "The Evolution of Central Banks," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570734, July.
  19. Winkler, Adalbert, 2011. "The joint production of confidence: lessons from nineteenth-century US commercial banks for twenty-first-century Euro area governments," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(03), pages 249-276, December.
  20. Ang, Andrew & Longstaff, Francis A., 2013. "Systemic sovereign credit risk: Lessons from the U.S. and Europe," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 493-510.
  21. Adalbert Winkler, 2012. "Warum kriegt Europa die Eurokrise nicht in den Griff?," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;German National Library of Economics, vol. 92(7), pages 449-456, July.
  22. Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobson Schwartz, 1965. "Why Was Monetary Policy So Inept?," NBER Chapters,in: The Great Contraction, 1929–33, pages 111-123 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. C. Randall HENNING & Martin KESSLER, 2012. "Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-31.
  24. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Timothy J., 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 309-330, November.
  25. Charles W. Calomiris, 1993. "Financial Factors in the Great Depression," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 61-85, Spring.
  26. William R. White, 2012. "Ultra easy monetary policy and the law of unintended consequences," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 126, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

The CitEc project has not yet found citations to this item.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.