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Der lender of last resort vor Gericht

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  • Winkler, Adalbert

Abstract

Ist das OMT-Programm der EZB mandatswidrig? Dieser Beitrag wendet die ökonomische Argumentation der OMT-Kritiker vor dem deutschen Bundesverfassungsgericht auf die seit Oktober 2008 praktizierte Vollzuteilungspolitik an. Der Vergleich zeigt, dass danach auch die Vollzuteilungspolitik mandatswidrig ist. Die EZB steht daher nicht als Staatsfinanzierer, sondern als lender of last resort vor Gericht. Ein Richterspruch gegen das OMT würde folglich eine ökonomische Argumentation bestätigen, die 150 Jahren moderner Zentralbankgeschichte widerspricht und den Euroraum den Instabilitäten von Finanzmärkten ausliefert. Ein solcher Währungsraum ist weder funktionsfähig noch wünschenswert.

Suggested Citation

  • Winkler, Adalbert, 2013. "Der lender of last resort vor Gericht," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 206, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:206
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lender of last resort; OMT-Programm; Vollzuteilungspolitik;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E53 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Deposit Insurance
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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