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Warum kriegt Europa die Eurokrise nicht in den Griff?

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  • Adalbert Winkler

Abstract

This paper argues that Europe is unable to get the euro crisis under control because it has chosen a crisis management strategy that is diametrically opposed to the one applied in the global financial crisis. In 2008, crisis management focused on measures that instilled confidence, while policies solving more fundamental problems were only applied at a later stage. In the euro crisis — following the advice of German economists strongly attached to the views of „Ordnungspolitik“ — crisis management aims at solving the fundamental problems first. Moreover, measures successfully applied in the 2008 crisis, including joint liability mechanisms, are now portrayed as counterproductive and even harmful. As a result, Europe has made little progress in fighting the crisis and creating the institutional foundations to do so successfully. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Adalbert Winkler, 2012. "Warum kriegt Europa die Eurokrise nicht in den Griff?," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;German National Library of Economics, vol. 92(7), pages 449-456, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:92:y:2012:i:7:p:449-456
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-012-1403-2
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10273-012-1403-2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Frenkel, Michael & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2012. "Bankenrettung, Bankenaufsicht und Bankenunion," Discussion Papers 323, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    2. Winkler, Adalbert, 2013. "Der lender of last resort vor Gericht," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 206, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    3. David M. Woodruff, 2014. "Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 81, European Institute, LSE.
    4. David M. Woodruff, 2014. "Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis," Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) 1, London School of Economics / European Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    E44; F34; F36;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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