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Zehn Jahre nach dem Konkurs von Lehman Brothers: Ordnungspolitische Irrtümer in der Bewertung der EZB-Geldpolitik seit der globalen Finanzkrise

Author

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  • Winkler Adalbert

    () (School of Finance & Management, Finance Department, Adickesallee 32–34, 60322 Frankfurt am MainFrankfurt School of Finance & ManagementFinance DepartmentAdickesallee 32-3460322 Frankfurt am MainGermany)

Abstract

Seit dem Konkurs von Lehman Brothers steht die Geldpolitik der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) in Deutschland unter verschärfter Beobachtung. Denn schon die Krisenmaßnahmen 2008/09 verstießen in grober Weise gegen aus ordnungspolitischer Sichtweise zentrale Prinzipien: das Haftungsprinzip und das Primat der Währungspolitik. Seit 2010 tragen Ökonomen, Journalisten und Politiker EZB-Kritik aber in bis dato unbekannter Schärfe vor, verbunden mit der Dauerwarnung oder der Prognose, dass als Folge der Geldpolitik Inflation, Finanzinstabilitäten, allgemeines Siechtum und andere extreme Risiken ins Haus stünden. Nichts davon hat sich bewahrheitet. Nach Adalbert Winkler ist dies auf zentrale Schwächen einer rigiden ordnungspolitischen Sichtweise zurückzuführen: auf die Unfähigkeit, Krisen als Liquiditätskrisen zu erfassen, und auf die Gleichsetzung von Stabilität mit der Wahl bestimmter geldpolitischer Instrumente statt mit dem Erreichen der Zielgröße Preisstabilität. Eine selbstkritische Aufarbeitung dieser Schwächen tut not, statt stets auf die lange Frist zu verweisen, in der sich angeblich die Richtigkeit der EZB-Kritik erweisen werde.

Suggested Citation

  • Winkler Adalbert, 2018. "Zehn Jahre nach dem Konkurs von Lehman Brothers: Ordnungspolitische Irrtümer in der Bewertung der EZB-Geldpolitik seit der globalen Finanzkrise," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 141-162, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pewipo:v:19:y:2018:i:2:p:141-162:n:6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    B25; E52; E58; Ordnungspolitik; Finanzkrise; Geldpolitik;

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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