Auctioning risk: The all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
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- Bettina Klose & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Auctioning risk: The all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences," ECON - Working Papers 097, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Dec 2017.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Einav Hart & Judith Avrahami & Yaakov Kareev, 2016. "Enlarging the market yet decreasing the profit: An experimental study of competitive behavior when investment affects the prize," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 11(4), pages 380-390, July.
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:95:y:2017:i:c:p:23-37 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; Contests; Mean-Variance preferences;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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