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The Impact of the Accession of the Western Balkan Countries on Voting and Coalition Formation within the European Council of Ministers

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  • Eleni Mylona

Abstract

This paper looks into the impact the accession of the Western Balkan countries of Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYROM would have on voting power in the EU Council. Particular attention is paid to the implications of a priori coalitions between member states. The Shapley-Shubik power index is used to estimate voting power and two scenarios are considered: accession under the Nice Treaty and the Reform Treaty rules. If the Western Balkans accede under the Nice Treaty rules then the efficiency and workability of the EU would deteriorate, although the “paradox of new members” might occur where the power of some existing members is increased. Conversely if the accession took place under the Reform Treaty rules then there would be little impact on the ability of the EU to act. The inefficiency of a priori coalition formation between countries of dissimilar size is revealed, as well as the likely occurrence of the “paradox of size” where some countries are made worse off through cooperation. The enlargement will not affect this.

Suggested Citation

  • Eleni Mylona, 2007. "The Impact of the Accession of the Western Balkan Countries on Voting and Coalition Formation within the European Council of Ministers," Discussion Papers 07/28, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:07/28
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    1. Johnston, R. J., 1995. "The Conflict over Qualified Majority Voting in the European Union Council of Ministers: An Analysis of the UK Negotiating Stance Using Power Indices," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(02), pages 245-254, April.
    2. Axel Moberg, 2002. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 259-282, June.
    3. Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
    4. Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J.M. & Fernandez, J.R., 2007. "The distribution of power in the European Constitution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(3), pages 1752-1766, February.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
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