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From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers

Listed author(s):
  • Nikolaos Antonakakis

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Department of Economics and Finance, University of Portsmouth)

  • Harald Badinger

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO))

  • Wolf Heinrich Reuter

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business)

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of EU member states' power, the EU's capability to act (efficiency), and the proportionality of the voting system in the Council of Ministers from the treaties of Rome in 1958 till the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and beyond, using a wide range of alternative power indices. Moreover, it considers explicitly the relevance of additional legal provisions (such as the 'Luxembourg Compromise', the 'Demographic Clause', and the 'Ioannina Compromise') and the implications of novel, more recently introduced voting rules such as reverse qualified majority voting.

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File URL: https://epub.wu.ac.at/4164/1/wp175.pdf
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Paper provided by Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number wuwp175.

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Date of creation: May 2014
Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp175
Note: PDF Document
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Web page: http://www.wu.ac.at/economics/en

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  1. Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez, J. R. & Jimenez, N. & Lopez, J. J., 2002. "Voting power in the European Union enlargement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 181-196, November.
  2. Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Guntram B. Wolff, 2012. "The messy rebuilding of Europe," Policy Briefs 719, Bruegel.
  3. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
  4. R J Johnston, 1978. "On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
  5. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
  6. Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
  7. Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J.M. & Fernandez, J.R., 2007. "The distribution of power in the European Constitution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(3), pages 1752-1766, February.
  8. Thomas K÷nig & Thomas Brõuninger, 2000. "Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choices of European Voting Rule," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 17, pages 107-123.
  9. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 291-308, July.
  10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Mika Widgrén, 2009. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making -super-1," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(1), pages 30-56, March.
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