IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wiw/wiwwuw/wuwp175.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers

Author

Listed:
  • Nikolaos Antonakakis

    () (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Department of Economics and Finance, University of Portsmouth)

  • Harald Badinger

    () (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO))

  • Wolf Heinrich Reuter

    () (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of EU member states' power, the EU's capability to act (efficiency), and the proportionality of the voting system in the Council of Ministers from the treaties of Rome in 1958 till the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and beyond, using a wide range of alternative power indices. Moreover, it considers explicitly the relevance of additional legal provisions (such as the 'Luxembourg Compromise', the 'Demographic Clause', and the 'Ioannina Compromise') and the implications of novel, more recently introduced voting rules such as reverse qualified majority voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolaos Antonakakis & Harald Badinger & Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2014. "From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp175, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp175
    Note: PDF Document
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://epub.wu.ac.at/4164/1/wp175.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    2. André Sapir & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Guntram Wolff, 2012. "The Messy Rebuilding of Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/174289, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
    4. Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J.M. & Fernandez, J.R., 2007. "The distribution of power in the European Constitution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(3), pages 1752-1766, February.
    5. Mika Widgrén, 2009. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making -super-1," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(1), pages 30-56, March.
    6. Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez, J. R. & Jimenez, N. & Lopez, J. J., 2002. "Voting power in the European Union enlargement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 181-196, November.
    7. R J Johnston, 1978. "On the Measurement of Power: Some Reactions to Laver," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
    8. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 291-308, July.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
    11. Thomas K÷nig & Thomas Brõuninger, 2000. "Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choices of European Voting Rule," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 17, pages 107-123.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fritz Breuss, 2013. "The Leverage of the Small Ones in the EU," WIFO Working Papers 452, WIFO.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Council; Enlargement; Efficiency; EU; Member States; Power Index;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp175. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://www.wu.ac.at/economics/en .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.