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Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design

Abstract

In the recent past, the choice of adequate voting weights and decision rules for the Council of the European Union (EU) has been a highly contested issue in EU intergovernmental negotiations. In general terms, the selection of a threshold for qualified majority votes (QMV) in the Council constitutes a trade-off in terms of decreased sovereignty for individual governments versus an increased collective ‘capacity to act’. This paper compares the effects of the proposal tabled by the Convention on the Future of Europe with the Nice Treaty provisions and the Lisbon Treaty, in terms of both the efficiency of decision-making and the distribution of relative voting power within the EU of twenty-seven member states. In addition, the paper shows how with the current size of EU membership, the EU risks being unable to reach intergovernmental agreement. Accordingly, a challenging issue for the future of the EU is to move towards reasonable provisions that allow its own constitution – if ever adopted – to get amended.

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Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 2 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 076-096

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Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2008_076
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Keywords: Council of the European Union; decision rules; constitutional design; capacity to act; power indices;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
  • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
  • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
  • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Johnston, R. J., 1995. "The Conflict over Qualified Majority Voting in the European Union Council of Ministers: An Analysis of the UK Negotiating Stance Using Power Indices," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(02), pages 245-254, April.
  2. Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgrén, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. D. Kilgour & Terrence Levesque, 1984. "The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 457-480, January.
  4. Axel Moberg, 2002. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 259-282, 06.
  5. Hosli, Madeleine O., 1993. "Admission of European Free Trade Association states to the European Community: effects on voting power in the European Community Council of Ministers," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(04), pages 629-643, September.
  6. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
  7. Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
  8. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
  9. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-464, December.
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Cited by:

  1. Zhi WANG & Shangjin WEI & Kei-Mu YI, "undated". "Value Chain in East Asia Production Network -An International Input-output Model Based Analysis," EcoMod2009 21500090, EcoMod.
  2. Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.
  3. František Turnovec, 2009. "Fairness and squareness: fair decision making rules in the EU Council?," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 110-124.
  4. Frantisek Turnovec, 2009. "Fairness and squareness: fair decision making rules in the eu council?," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 110-124.
  5. Frantisek Turnovec, 2011. "Quota Manipulation And Fair Voting Rules In Committees," EcoMod2011 3186, EcoMod.
  6. Pavel Doležel, 2011. "Estimating the Efficiency of Voting in Big Size Committees," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 172-190, August.
  7. František Turnovec, 2008. "National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 154-173, September.
  8. Meyer, Eric, 2013. "Die Macht der Mitgliedstaaten im Ministerrat der EU und im Ministerrat für Fragen der Währungsunion nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon," Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 36, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).
  9. František Turnovec, 2012. "Quota Manipulation and Fair Voting Rules in Committees," Working Papers IES 2012/08, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Mar 2012.

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