IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jcmkts/v40y2002i2p259-282.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council

Author

Listed:
  • Axel Moberg

Abstract

The article examines debates on institutional reform in the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2000) that culminated in the Nice summit, and the effects of various proposals. The main issues were the indirect power Member States acquired through blocking minorities and how the outcome could be presented at home. The changes were rather modest, with two exceptions. A new population criterion gives Germany greater blocking power than the other large countries and preserves the possibility of three large countries together blocking in an EU of 27 members. Spain’s voting weight increased substantially. The new blocking possibilities will affect the relative bargaining position of countries rather than the Union’s decision‐making capability.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Moberg, 2002. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 259-282, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:259-282
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00354
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00354
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1468-5965.00354?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Madeleine O. Hosli, 2008. "Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 076-096, March.
    2. Madeleine O. Hosli & M. C. J. Uriot, 2011. "Dimensions of Political Contestation: Voting in the Council of the European Union before the 2004 Enlargement," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 231-248, November.
    3. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2015. "The measurement of a priori voting power," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 8, pages 117-139, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Jürgen Neyer, 2002. "Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to European Governance," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 57, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    5. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    6. Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martınez & Federico Valenciano, 2006. "Success Versus Decisiveness," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 185-205, April.
    7. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2014. "Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 501-519, September.
    8. Eleni Mylona, 2007. "The Impact of the Accession of the Western Balkan Countries on Voting and Coalition Formation within the European Council of Ministers," Discussion Papers 07/28, Department of Economics, University of York.
    9. Yener Kandogan, 2005. "Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1147-1156.
    10. Elisabetta Croci Angelini, 2007. "Resisting Globalization: Voting Power Indices and the National Interest in the EU Decision-making," Working Papers 08-2007, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Feb 2009.
    11. Loek Groot & Erik Zonneveld, 2013. "European Union Budget Contributions and Expenditures: A Lorenz Curve Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 649-666, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:259-282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.