IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/yor/hectdg/25-03.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Great Escape: Physicians Leaving the Public Sector

Author

Listed:
  • Bertoli, P.;
  • Grembi, V.;

Abstract

In many countries, public healthcare systems are facing the unprecedented challenge of attracting new physicians and retaining existing physicians. Given that the role of non economic factors in responding to such a challenge is as important as the role played by economic factors, we use outbreaks of healthcare scandals from 2000 to 2020 in approximately 100 Italian provinces to address the impact of perceived corruption on the density of public hospital physicians. The outbreak of a scandal is associated with a 3.6% decrease in the presence of public hospital physicians. The effect is explained mainly by so-called supply-side drivers, such as ethical concerns(i.e., a scandal related to a malpractice case),a lack of motivation in the workplace, concerns about the high salience of the scandal(e.g. more media coverage),and more outside options. Demand-side drivers, such as a lower level of trust on the patient side, which affects the patient distribution and, indirectly, the physician distribution, do not seem to play a crucial role within the institutional setting analyzed. Our results are robust to different staggered DID estimators, the inclusion of trends to capture potential time-varying attitudes toward corrupt behaviours, and the inclusion of variables that are expected to affect both the density of public hospital physicians and the occurrence of scandals. Healthcare scandals do not seem to affect the density of other types of civil servants, such as teachers or firefighters.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertoli, P.; & Grembi, V.;, 2025. "The Great Escape: Physicians Leaving the Public Sector," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 25/03, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:hectdg:25/03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/hedg/workingpapers/2025/2503.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    healthcare; corruption; staggered Di-in-Di; physicians' supply;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • I19 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Other
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:hectdg:25/03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jane Rawlings (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deyoruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.