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Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context

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  • Joseph A. Clougherty

Abstract

Managers are increasingly uncertain over the source (home-nation or foreign-nation) of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers with significant international implications. I propose a conceptual framework that predicts the source of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers. Under idealized institutional assumptions, I find an industry's global competitiveness to be the primary driver behind holdup source: a contention supported by empirical tests based on the merger policies of 27 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2000 period. I also relax the idealized institutional conditions to yield more precise propositions tailored to the cross-national environment for antitrust policy. Finally, I generate prescriptive propositions that yield implications for effective political strategies. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - ("Ein institutioneller Ländervergleich von 'hold-up' durch Wettbewerbs-behörden in Fusionsverfahren und deren Implikationen für die Fusions-strategien von globalen Unternehmen") Bei großen Fusionen, die für den internationalen Markt Bedeutung haben, stehen Manager zunehmend vor der Unsicherheit, im Vorfeld nicht erkennen zu können, ob die kartellrechtlichen Überprüfungen der Fusion eher im Heimatland oder im Ausland zu einem aus Unternehmenssicht negativen Ergebnis führen, also die Fusion abgelehnt oder nur unter restriktiven Auflagen genehmigt wird ('hold-up'). Hier wird ein konzeptioneller Ansatz entwickelt, mit dem sich vorhersagen lässt, welche der kartellrechtlichen Prüfungen zu dem restriktivsten Ergebnis führt. Unter idealisierten Annahmen über die institutionelle Ausgestaltung der nationalen Kartellbehörden lässt sich die theoretische Hypothese aufstellen, dass vor allem die weltweite Wettbewerbsfähigkeit einer Branche eine Rolle bei der Zuordnung des hold-up-Problems spielt, was auch empirisch durch die Entscheidungen von 27 Kartellinstitutionen im Zeitraum von 1992-2000 bestätigt wird. Die idealisierten institutionellen Bedingungen in den verschiedenen Ländern werden daraufhin aufgegeben, um exaktere und auf die tatsächlichen kartellrechtlichen Umgebungen in den einzelnen Ländern abgestimmte Empfehlungen formulieren zu können. Für die Unternehmen werden schließlich Empfehlungen für effektive politische Fusionsstrategien entwickelt.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph A. Clougherty, 2004. "Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2004-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Barros, Pedro P. & Clougherty, Joseph A. & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2013. "Europeanization of EU member-state competition policy: The commission's leadership role," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 41-51.
    2. Joseph A. Clougherty & Tomaso Duso, 2009. "The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(8), pages 1365-1395, December.
    3. Julie Bower & Howard Cox, 2013. "Merger regulation, firms, and the co-evolutionary process: An empirical study of internationalisation in the UK alcoholic beverages industry 1985-2005," Working Papers 48, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Political Strategy; Non-Market Strategy; Merger Reviews; Antitrust Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade

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