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Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context

  • Joseph A. Clougherty

Managers are increasingly uncertain over the source (home-nation or foreign-nation) of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers with significant international implications. I propose a conceptual framework that predicts the source of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers. Under idealized institutional assumptions, I find an industry's global competitiveness to be the primary driver behind holdup source: a contention supported by empirical tests based on the merger policies of 27 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2000 period. I also relax the idealized institutional conditions to yield more precise propositions tailored to the cross-national environment for antitrust policy. Finally, I generate prescriptive propositions that yield implications for effective political strategies. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - ("Ein institutioneller Ländervergleich von 'hold-up' durch Wettbewerbs-behörden in Fusionsverfahren und deren Implikationen für die Fusions-strategien von globalen Unternehmen") Bei großen Fusionen, die für den internationalen Markt Bedeutung haben, stehen Manager zunehmend vor der Unsicherheit, im Vorfeld nicht erkennen zu können, ob die kartellrechtlichen Überprüfungen der Fusion eher im Heimatland oder im Ausland zu einem aus Unternehmenssicht negativen Ergebnis führen, also die Fusion abgelehnt oder nur unter restriktiven Auflagen genehmigt wird ('hold-up'). Hier wird ein konzeptioneller Ansatz entwickelt, mit dem sich vorhersagen lässt, welche der kartellrechtlichen Prüfungen zu dem restriktivsten Ergebnis führt. Unter idealisierten Annahmen über die institutionelle Ausgestaltung der nationalen Kartellbehörden lässt sich die theoretische Hypothese aufstellen, dass vor allem die weltweite Wettbewerbsfähigkeit einer Branche eine Rolle bei der Zuordnung des hold-up-Problems spielt, was auch empirisch durch die Entscheidungen von 27 Kartellinstitutionen im Zeitraum von 1992-2000 bestätigt wird. Die idealisierten institutionellen Bedingungen in den verschiedenen Ländern werden daraufhin aufgegeben, um exaktere und auf die tatsächlichen kartellrechtlichen Umgebungen in den einzelnen Ländern abgestimmte Empfehlungen formulieren zu können. Für die Unternehmen werden schließlich Empfehlungen für effektive politische Fusionsstrategien entwickelt.

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Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number SP II 2004-09.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Strategic Management Journal , Vol. 26(8), 2005, pp. 769-790.
Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2004-09
Contact details of provider: Postal: Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany
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  9. Joseph A Clougherty, 2001. "Globalization and the Autonomy of Domestic Competition Policy: An Empirical Test on the World Airline Industry," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 32(3), pages 459-478, September.
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  18. Long, William F & Schramm, Richard & Tollison, Robert D, 1973. "The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 351-64, October.
  19. Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
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