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The environmental protection authority as a monopoly

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  • Leon Taylor

    (Dillard University)

Abstract

Small jurisdictions vie for economic development by relaxing pollution controls. This can cause damaging spillovers. Many policy analysts recommend replacing the small jurisdictions with a single authority that taxes development. But as the sole producer of development rights to a unique area, the authority will permit less development than is Pareto- efficient. Whether it can sustain monopoly power depends upon the form of its tax on development. Periodic taxes (such as annual property taxes) will sustain market power longer than will onetime taxes (such as those on transfer of ownership). Rather than create a monopoly, one can create an authority that taxes small jurisdictions for spillovers but otherwise lets them compete

Suggested Citation

  • Leon Taylor, 1998. "The environmental protection authority as a monopoly," Public Economics 9810007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9810007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    land use; environmental protection;

    JEL classification:

    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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