The Political Economy of Elite Dominance and Ethnic
Despite more than four decades of planning efforts with an emphasis on balanced regional development, inter- and intra-state disparities in key indicators of quality of life in India are striking. Using Indian state- level data for the period 1960-92, the present paper examines the nature of political economy of elite dominance and ethnic heterogeneity, both of which could in principle be responsibel for lower the provision of public services. Fixed–effects panel data estimates seem to confirm that (a) greater degree of elite dominance lowers the spending on education (but not that on health) while greater degree of ethnic heterogeneity lowers spending on both health and education. (b) Also, predominance of Indian National Congress regime has been higher in states with greater dominance of elite upper class and ethnic heterogeneity. Thus there is a close correspondence between political regimes and social development spending in the sample states though there is a clear lack of convergence in state spending on health and education suggesting the divergent agenda of the state governments in India.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000.
"Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2003.
"Wealth, health, and health services in rural Rajasthan,"
175, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies..
- Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Wealth, Health, and Health Services in Rural Rajasthan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 326-330, May.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2003. "Wealth, health, and health services in rural Rajasthan," Working Papers 253, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Health and Wellbeing..
- Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Wealth, health, and health services in rural rajasthan," Framed Field Experiments 00121, The Field Experiments Website.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2004.
"The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India,"
Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers
04-17, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Somanathan, Rohini, 2007. "The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 287-314, March.
- Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0509010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.