The Political Economy of Elite Dominance and Ethnic
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Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CWA-2005-10-04 (Central and Western Asia)
- NEP-EDU-2005-10-04 (Education)
- NEP-SOC-2005-10-04 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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